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CONFRONTING CHAOS: THE FISCAL
CONSTITUTION FACES FEDERAL SHUTDOWNS
AND (ALMOST) DEBT DEFAULTS
Charles Tiefer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent events raise the question of whether two near-failures in
what scholars call the "Fiscal Constitution"1 may plunge the government
into paralysis or chaos. In October 2013, a lapse in congressional
appropriations 2  shut the government down for two weeks. The
shutdown 3 furloughed hundreds of thousands of federal employees. 4 It
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1. The Fiscal Constitution provides the framework for borrowing, spending, taxing, and
budgeting. See Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777,
796 (2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010)). Besides constitutional provisions, it includes key statutes,
regulations, and practices. See Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593, 600 (1988) [hereinafter Stith, Rewriting]. It is the legal
framework that governs the federal budget process. For discussions of the Fiscal Constitution, see
Huq, supra, at 796-99; Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1363 & n.97
(1988) [hereinafter Stith, Congress ]; Kate Stith, Rewriting, supra, at 600, 652; Charles Tiefer,
"Budgetized" Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress's 1995-1996 Budget
Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 415, 418-19, 423-24 (1996) [hereinafter Tiefer, "Budgetized'];
Charles Tiefer, Congress's Transformative "Republican Revolution" in 2001-2006 and the Future
of One-Party Rule, 23 J.L. & POL. 233, 234 n.7, 237 nn.39 & 41 (2007) [hereinafter Tiefer,
Congress's Transformative].
2. For recent discussions of appropriations, see Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited
War and the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 477
(2011); Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: The
Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822,
1825, 1827 (2012).
3. Paul Kane & Josh Hicks, So Far on Capitol Hill, No End in Sight over
Shutdown, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-cancels-asia-
trip-as-shutdown-debate-shifts-from-health-care-law-to-debt-ceiling/2013/10/04/8225784c-2cf5-
11e3-8ade-alt23cdal35e story.html.
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caused some agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"),
virtually to close their doors and to curtail their services.5
Simultaneously, and potentially even more devastating, the House
of Representatives (alternatively "House") firmly refused during an
extremely tense countdown to raise the statutory debt ceiling of the
6government. When the government hits that ceiling, it cannot borrow
any more money.7 The government cannot meet all of its program
obligations-like Social Security-without borrowing.8 As a result, once
the debt ceiling is reached, the government may be unable to meet its
debt interest obligations, causing it to default on the national debt.9
The nation would face calamity. Nonetheless, tremendous national
pressure failed to budge recalcitrants in the House until, with the
utmost reluctance, the House finally held a vote on October 17 to
allow borrowing, just one day before the government would have hit the
debt ceiling.°
The President had no clear authority to cure the consequences of a
congressional refusal, either to appropriate money or to raise the debt
ceiling, since he can neither appropriate nor borrow without Congress's
permission.1 In October 2013, the nation pulled through because the
4. Impact of a Government Shutdown, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/special/politics/2013-shutdown-federal-department-impact (last updated Oct. 2, 2013).
5. ld; Brad Plumer, The Nine Most Painful Impacts of a Government Shutdown, WASH.
POST (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/01/the-nine-
most-painful-consequences-of-a-govemment-shutdown.
6. See Brad Plumer, Absolutely Everything You Need to Know About the Debt Ceiling,
WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/04/
absolutely-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-debt-ceiling.
7. Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 135,
153 (2005).
8. See Ray Martin, Social Security Offices to Be Impacted by Government Shutdown, CBS
NEWS (OCT. 1, 2013, 11:58 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/social-security-offices-to-be-
impacted-by-government-shutdown; see also Tiefer, "Budgetized," supra note 1, at 416-18
(discussing the budgetary deficiencies of the Social Security Administration over the last thirty
years).
9. Jason Lange, Factbox: How and When Might the United States Default?,
REUTERS.COM (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/16/us-usa-fiscal-qa-
idUSBRE99FORI20131016.
10. Michael D. Shear & Jeremy W. Peters, Senators Near Fiscal Deal;
House Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2013, at Al; Lori Montgomery & Rosalind S.
Helderman, Federal Shutdown Ends, Obama Signs Bill, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/federal-shutdown-nears-end-as-senate-votes-to-
raise-debt-limit/2013/10/17/a65544ba-368f-l I e3-ae46-e4248e75c8ea story.html.
11. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Borrowing by any Other Name: Why
Presidential "Spending Cuts" Would Still Exceed the Debt Ceiling, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
26, 30 (2014) ("[T]he U.S. Constitution explicitly confers upon Congress the powers to spend, tax,
and borrow.").
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House yielded. 12 A question remains of obvious interest: what could the
President do if faced with another, longer shutdown, or, even more
devastating, the actual hitting of the debt ceiling? There has been
surprisingly little scholarly discussion of these specific questions. The
author of this Article was invited to participate in television, radio, and
newspaper coverage of the October 2013 problems. Certain proposals
that were alluded to in the media receive their first developed
presentation here. 
13
Part II of this Article deals with shutdowns. 14 The Executive Branch
analyzed what it could legally do on several occasions: in the key 1980
Attorney General Opinion ("Civiletti Opinion"); 15 during the similar
shutdown in 1995;16 and in 2011.17 However, in none of those analyses
did the government get beyond a static approach to the problems that
follow a shutdown. It assumed that the same considerations about what
government activities should be brought to a halt that apply on Day One
of a shutdown would continue to apply in just the same way on Day
Fifteen or Fifty. In contrast, taking a dynamic view would permit the
government to change directions as the shutdown ensues. Recognizing
that the adverse impact of the shutdown increases over time, the
government could bring back workers from furloughs, agency by
agency, as the shutdown continues.
Emphatically, seeking methods of mitigating the worst possible
consequences of hitting the debt ceiling by developing a playbook
should not be seen as minimizing those awful consequences. Going
"over the fiscal cliff' entails a failure to carry out key responsibilities,
12. See Montgomery & Helderman, supra note 10.
13. Jim McElhatton, Fed Shutdown Forces Courts to 'Limbo Land,' WASH. TIMES, Aug. 25,
2014, at A6; Andrew Cohen, The Odd Story of the Law that Dictates How Government Shutdowns
Work, ATLANTIC (Sept. 28, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/
the-odd-story-of-the-law-that-dictates-how-govemment-shutdowns-work/280047; Scott Horsley, A
Short History of Government Shutdowns, NPR (Sept. 30, 2013, 3:32 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/
09/30/227292952/a-short-history-of-govemment-shutdowns; S.A. Miller, Government Restart Will
Cost Billions, N.Y. POST (Oct. 17, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/10/17/panda-cam-is-
back; The Cycle: President Obama Has More Cards to Play (NBC News radio broadcast Oct. 10,
2013).
14. See infra Part [I.
15. Scott Horsley, The Lawyer Who Raised the Shutdown Stakes, NPR (Apr. 8, 2011, 3:00
PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/04/08/135247483/who-raised-the-stakes-in-government-shutdown.
16. See Kelly Phillips Erb, Government Shutdown 101: What Happens When the Lights Go
Off?, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2013, 10:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2013/09/20/
government-shutdown- 101 -what-happens-when-the-lights-go-off.
17. Christopher D. Dodge, Note, Doomed to Repeat: Why Sequestration and the Budget
Control Act of2011 Are Unlikely to Solve Our Solvency Woes, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
835, 858-59 (2012).
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and could easily lead to a nightmare default scenario.18 Those who
would use the false excuse of an orderly handling to trigger a giant fiscal
disaster are like those who would use the excuse of limited missile
defenses to bring on a war with nations having extensive nuclear
arsenals. With this caveat about false optimism, it would still be better to
react constructively to default in whatever ways are possible than to
collapse helplessly like run-over road kill.
As to hitting the debt ceiling, two leading legal scholars,' 9 among
others, 0 have postulated that the President could act to borrow without
congressional authorization (or that there could be some other major
reallocation of constitutional borrowing and spending powers) by relying
on some relatively abstract constitutional, theoretical approaches; from
reasoning based on the nature of the constitutional separation of powers,
they argued that the rarely-invoked "Public Debt Clause"2' (section four
of the Fourteenth Amendment),22 supports this approach.23 Abstract
constitutional theory has its place, but this time it crashed and burned
when President Barack Obama summarily disclaimed any intention of
invoking it, or of issuing a trillion dollar platinum coin.
As a result, the pragmatic issue we confront is how, without
resorting to imaginative, but questionable, constitutional theories, the
President can act within the existing framework of separated powers to
18. There is a technical distinction: hitting the debt ceiling means the government cannot
borrow any more money. Since the budget is at a deficit, the government cannot, without
borrowing, pay all of its spending responsibilities. However, the further question is whether the
government manages, while falling short on other spending responsibilities, to pay interest on the
debt. Only when the government does not pay interest on the debt does it go into debt default.
19. Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Doff, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Debt Ceiling:
When Negotiating over Spending and Tax Laws, Congress and the President Should Consider the
Debt Ceiling a Dead Letter, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 32, 36 (2013) [hereinafter Buchanan &
Dorf, Bargaining]; Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Doff, How to Choose the Least
Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1182 (2012) [hereinafter Buchanan & Doff, How to Choose]; Neil H.
Buchanan & Michael C. Doff, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat Once and for All: Why the
President Should Embrace the Least Unconstitutional Option, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 237,
239 (2012) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, Nullifying].
20. Daniel Strickland, The Public Debt Clause Debate: Who Controls This Lost Section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 775, 794-95 (2012); Jacob D. Charles, Note, The
Debt Limit and the Constitution: How the Fourteenth Amendment Forbids Fiscal Obstructionism,
62 DUKE L.J. 1227, 1248-50 (2013); Kelleigh Irwin Fagan, Note, The Best Choice Out of Poor
Options: What the Government Should Do (or Not Do) If Congress Fails to Raise the Debt Ceiling,
46 IND. L. REV. 205, 227, 230 (2013).
21. For a valuable discussion on the invocation of the Public Debt Clause, see generally Stuart
McCommas, Note, Forgotten but Not Lost: The Original Public Meaning of Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 99 VA. L. REV. 1291 (2013).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
23. 1d; see Buchanan & Doff, Bargaining, supra note 19, at 36-40.
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salvage public credit and avoid chaos in a debt limit crisis. This is
virtually uncharted territory, and there is very limited information
available;24 no one has seriously sought to develop a "playbook" for how
the President might go about avoiding such chaos without Congress.
However, the President may attempt this with the assistance of the
Federal Reserve, which has powers that could mitigate crises in the
sphere of credit. The President has some control over the machinery of
disbursing payments, and the Federal Reserve may deploy the dramatic
type of lending facilities it opened in the crash of 2008 to sustain
besieged credit sectors.26 To create such a playbook will require a
ground-level crawl through how Washington actually disburses and
lends money.27
The problem is not merely that "[t]he federal government now has
to borrow about forty cents of every dollar it spends., 28 Nor is the
problem, merely, that during a debt default, the government will face a
mountain of spending requirements that amount in total to more than it
can satisfy. These include: interest on the national debt; Social Security
24. There are two important sources of information. One 2012 source mentioned some
Treasury views. Letter from Eric M. Thorson, Chair, Council of the Inspectors Gen. on Fin.
Oversight, to Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Fin. (Aug. 24, 2012) [hereinafter
TIGTA Report]. As Deborah Solomon and Dan Strumpf have noted:
During the last big debt-ceiling standoff, in the summer of 2011, the Treasury
Department was in advanced intemal discussions about prioritizing interest payments on
government debt ahead of other bills, but the decisions didn't have to be activated
because Congress raised the debt ceiling, according to a person familiar with the
planning.
Deborah Solomon & Dan Strumpf, Bankers Warn on Debt Proposal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2013, at
Al. For not just the best, but rather, the only analysis of what happens after reaching the debt limit,
see generally BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., DEBT LIMIT ANALYSIS (Sept. 2013) [hereinafter DEBT
LIMIT ANALYSIS]. Invaluable as these are, they did not remotely approach a "playbook" of what the
government could do. For example, neither mentions a role for the Federal Reserve. For a good
overview of the Debt Ceiling analysis, see generally MINDY R. LEVIT ET AL., REACHING THE DEBT
LIMIT: BACKGROUND AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (2013). However,
as to the feasibility of any version of prioritization, it does not add to the other sources.
25. For background, see generally Constitutional Law-Separation of Powers-Congress
Delegates Power to Raise the Debt Ceiling, 125 HARV. L. REv. 867 (2012) [hereinafter
Constitutional Law]. For an overall treatment of history as a basis for Presidential power, see
generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,
126 HARv. L. REv. 411 (2012).
26. See Michael Fitts & Robert Inman, Controlling Congress: Presidential Influence in
Domestic Fiscal Policy, 80 GEo. L.J. 1737, 1758-59 (1992) (discussing the ways in which the
President can influence fiscal policy); What Were the Federal Reserve's Emergency Lending
Facilities During the Financial Crisis?, FED. RES., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/
banking_ 12842.htm (last updated June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Emergency Lending Facilities]
(discussing the steps the Federal Reserve took in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis).
27. See generally Fitts & Inman, supra note 26.
28. G.I., The Debt Ceiling and Default, ECONOMIST (Jan. 13, 2011, 5:48 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freexchange/20 11/01/americasdebt.
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benefits; Medicare, Medicaid, and other health care; defense and civil
contractors; defense and civil pay, and other operating costs;
entitlements like benefits for federal retirees and veterans; and so on.
Rather, the Treasury asserts a worse problem than the scale of its
responsibilities, namely that it cannot itself achieve, logistically, any
prioritizing of its own three million payments daily. The Financial
Management Service ("FMS") in the Office of the Fiscal Service of the
Treasury 29 combines these streams of payment obligations and payment
requests from scores of agencies.30 It does not have an accounting
system for sorting them out by priority.31 Moreover, the Federal Reserve
may not nakedly lend the Treasury the money to meet its needs,
something outside of the government's experience.32 Rather, the
President has to use his overall executive authority over the effectuation
of spending, and perhaps some additional authority from the Public Debt
Clause, to take steps that the public will accept due to their resemblance
to normal executive disbursement, albeit stretched to the maximum.
3
Part III of this Article deals with the steps the government may take
when it hits the debt ceiling: paying interest comes separately and with
priority; disbursements get treated separately from Treasury, Defense,
and health care (each may disburse in single-day blocs); corporate
taxpayers may make early deposits; and the Federal Reserve may defer
federal debt interest and principal repayments, handle contractors and
health care providers, and perhaps even "deem" the Social Security
payments manageable.34
At the outset of the analysis, in order to spare the nation the long-
lasting tragedy ensuing from even a temporary credit default on the
interest on the national debt, the President and his Treasury will move
heaven and earth to pay the interest in full, through a separate channel
from the three million combined daily Treasury payments.35
Subsequently, the Treasury would execute the one course of action
it quietly hinted it might adopt in 2011: disburse, in staggered sets, its
29. David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 210 (2010).
30. See id. at 210-11; Neal Wolin, Treasury: Proposals to "Prioritize" Payments
on U.S. Debt Not Workable; Would Not Prevent Default, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY (Jan.
21, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/connectfblog/pages/proposals-to-prioritize-payments-on-us-
debt-not-workable-would-not-prevent-default.aspx. Neal Wolin was Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury. Wolin, supra.
31. Plumer, supra note 6.
32. See Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve as Last Resort, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69, 84-
87 (2012); Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 19, at 1183-84.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4; see, e.g., Strickland, supra note 20, at 792.
34. See infra Part Ilt.
35. See Fagan, supra note 20, at 233-38. The note is good on this one issue, but does not
provide a playbook about a range of strategies.
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own enormous daily sets of payments, each set representing one whole
36day's requests. Each set would be disbursed one or more days after the
original target date for payment.37 It would thereby pay off, subject to
increasing delays, its obligations other than interest, such as payments to
defense and civilian contractors, military and civilian pay, Social
Security payments,38 and health provider claims for Medicare and
Medicaid.3 9 Paying each day's set, on a staggered basis, would be the
one way the Treasury could, as it has hinted, match its titanic streams of
incoming and outgoing payments, without resorting to the external
borrowing precluded by hitting the debt ceiling.40
This Article's playbook, though, notes that the Treasury would not
be alone.41 Contrary to popular understanding, the Treasury's fiscal
arm-FMS-does not disburse all the government's payments entirely
by itself in its own single Treasury stream.42 The fiscal arms of the
government for defense-Defense Finance and Accounting Services
("DFAS")-and health care-Center of Medicare and Medicaid
Services ("CMS")-may function separately from the Treasury.43 FMS,
DFAS, and CMS may husband the government's resources by staggered
payments, each one able separately to put off each of its own day's set of
payments for some days. Beyond this, DFAS and CMS may be able to
hold back on some categories, like contractor and medical provider
payments, within their own overall flow of disbursements.44
36. DEBT LIMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 8, 26; TIGTA Report, supra note 24, at 6.
37. DEBT LIMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 26.
38. For the legal context of Social Security, see generally Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security
and Government Deficits: When Should We Worry?, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 257 (2007); William G.
Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 461 (1996); Matthew H.
Hawes, So No Damn Politician Can Ever Scrap It: The Constitutional Protection of Social Security
Benefits, 65 U. PITT. L. REv. 865 (2004); June E. O'Neill, Why Social Security Needs Fundamental
Reform, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 79 (2004); Benjamin A. Templin, Full Funding: The Future of Social
Security, 22 J.L. & POL. 395 (2006).
39. For the legal context of Medicare and Medicaid, see generally Elizabeth Andersen,
Administering Health Care: Lessons from the Health Care Financing Administration's Waiver
Policy-Making, 10 J.L. & POL. 215 (1994); Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the
Medicaid Program: A Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855 (1990); Judith M. Rosenberg
& David T. Zaring, Managing Medicaid Waivers: Section 1115 and State Health Care Reform, 32
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 545 (1995).
40. See DEBT LIMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 26; Plumer, supra note 6.
41. See infra Part III.D.
42. See All About Us: An Overview, TREASURY.GOV, http://www.fins.treas.gov/aboutfms/
index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015); infra Part III.D.
43. As discussed below, DFAS in the Department of Defense ("DoD") pays its own stream of
disbursements, and the CMS, in the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") Office of
Financial Management, each processes its own separate stream. See infra Part III.D.
44. For example, it may be that most of CMS payments go to health providers. When CMS
holds back disbursements as a whole, it principally holds back provider payments. These go to
2014]
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW
Most aggressively, the President may tell the Treasury to accelerate
its receipt of revenues, such as by requiring corporate taxpayers to make
an early deposit of their next corporate quarterly estimated tax payment.
The Treasury's assertion of powers in this regard would face tough
questions. But, in the moment of crisis, the Treasury might
manage to secure-without creating new taxes or rates-a vitally-
needed acceleration in the timing of its receipt of an incoming
stream of revenues.45
Turning, then, to what the Federal Reserve can do,46 it would have
an even wider range of possible courses of action, from moderate to
extremely aggressive. The Federal Reserve could stretch its own powers
to bolster the economy in the crisis; this would also reduce the
Treasury's need to put its own scarce dollars in the hands of those
awaiting government funds.47 Since the Federal Reserve has a $2.8
trillion balance sheet, of which more than $1 trillion is already in
Treasury securities, it has all the financial weight it needs to help handle
this crisis for a while.48
The Federal Reserve might open a facility to acquire as much as
possible of the interest payments and principal repayment
responsibilities that would otherwise fall upon the Treasury-and then
defer them.49 It could also open a facility for lending to the categories of
business creditors, like government contractors and health care
providers, whose expected payments from DFAS and CMS might have
been delayed. In doing all this, the Federal Reserve would neither lend
entities that can stand a short delay-a delay, which the Federal Reserve may mitigate, as discussed
below. See infra text accompanying notes 277-87.
45. For guidance on how the Treasury and IRS circumvent normal rulemaking procedures,
see Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1544, 1612 (2006); Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax
Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAx REV. 269, 294-95, 308-09 (2012).
46. This Part draws on the discussions of the Federal Reserve's tools, a general discussion of
which can be seen in Baker, supra note 32; Josd Gabilondo, Financial Hospitals: Defending the
Fed's Role as a Market Maker of Last Resort, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 731 (2013). See also Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial
Meltdown of2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1629-30 (2009).
47. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 32, at 121-24.
48. Phil Izzo, A Look Inside the Fed's Balance Sheet, WALL ST. J. BLOG (June 21, 2011, 4:49
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/06/21/a-look-inside-the-feds-balance-sheet- 11.
49. Moderate steps would include the Federal Reserve deferring interest payment and
principal repayment on its own $4 trillion balance sheet while making very large additional
purchases of short-term Treasury bills.
50. The Federal Reserve may greatly bolster a Treasury demand for advance deposit of
corporations' next estimated payment, by lending a sum equal to their deposit.
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directly to the Treasury, nor violate the debt limit. It would simply do
what it did, starting in 2008, to mitigate an economic crisis.5 1
As its most aggressive step, the Federal Reserve could take on the
800-pound elephant in the room: the huge Treasury disbursements owed
monthly to Social Security beneficiaries. 2 The Federal Reserve could
arrange with the Treasury to have, temporarily, a new status. Namely,
Social Security beneficiaries would receive, nominally, a "loan" to them
in the amount of each scheduled Social Security payment. 3 This would
technically recharacterize the distributions as loans from the Federal
Reserve's balance sheet (which does not count as borrowings subject to
the debt ceiling) rather than as Treasury disbursements (that would push
borrowing over the debt ceiling). Social Security's special status would
elicit the strongest possible public support. To find sufficient legal
support, the President could draw legitimately on the legal doctrine of
ratification, discussed by many scholars, 54 including the author,55 as
justification in the crisis. 6
While much of this Article does analyze new situations and
proposals, the Article is far from unsupported guesswork. The analysis
draws upon many past actions that serve as precedents. These include:
the Civiletti Opinion and other opinions on shutdowns from then
through 2011; the views of the Treasury in 2011 about how it might
disburse payments after hitting the debt ceiling; current flexibility in the
existing tax laws; the broad array of lending facilities mobilized by the
Federal Reserve after the 2008 economic crisis; and the judicial opinions
51. This will technically re-characterize the payments by DFAS and CMS, without
interruption, in a way that the disbursement would be deemed an outflow from the Federal Reserve.
These will not constitute a payment that pushes the Treasury above the debt ceiling.
52. FED. RESERVE SYS., PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 98 (9th ed. 2005).
53. These are like Federal Reserve loans to the government's contractor and health provider
creditors. Correspondingly, now that these beneficiary payments have become Federal Reserve
loans, the Federal Reserve will make an immediate remittance to the Treasury on the scale of these
beneficiary payments. The Federal Reserve reimburses the Treasury, fairly, for the Federal Reserve
converting its distributions to the beneficiaries, into loans from the beneficiaries to the Federal
Reserve. This is the Federal Reserve sustaining the Treasury's creditors and beneficiaries, since the
Treasury temporarily lacks the means to do so.
54. For information on Presidential ratification, see, for example, David Gray Adler, The
Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 155, 178-80 (2002);
Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1993);
Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 377,
406, 407 & n.88 (2011) (Book Review); Note, Recapturing the War Power, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1815, 1817, 1819, 1830 (2006).
55. Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late 1900s by Partial Congressional Declaration,
36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1999).
56. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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approving the doctrine of ratification from the Civil War to the
Vietnam War.
57
Part IV of this Article is a very brief conclusion.58 That Part
justifies the relatively small-bore approach of the playbook compared to
the imaginative constitutional approaches others have propounded by
comparing the presumptively valid inductive approach5 9 to the
constitutional separation of powers it adopts with the deductive approach
of other proposed solutions. 60 That is, this Article's approach does not
deduce lofty propositions from the wording, background, and structure
of the Constitution as expounded by the Supreme Court. Rather, the
playbook approach builds up inductively from the specific practical
details of the activities of lending and disbursement. 61 This approach
creates a realistic picture of how the constitutional separation of powers
might work to mitigate a crisis.
II. SHUTDOWN
A. Shutdown Sequence
1. From 1981
Two precedents, broadly speaking, shaped the 2013 shutdown.62
Analyzing them suggests how a certain kind of executive flexibility
could mitigate such shutdowns.
In 1981, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti issued what is known
(and has been referred to) as the Civiletti Opinion regarding what shall
occur during a lapse of appropriations for a substantial part of the
government. 6 ' An opinion issued in the previous year had put together
57. See Monaghan, supra note 54, at 35-38. See generally Orlando v. Laird,
443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); Auth. for the Continuance of Gov't Functions During a Temp. Lapse
in Appropriation, 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Civiletti Opinion]; THE FEDERAL
RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/lectures/about.htm; Solomon & Strumpf, supra note 24;
Memorandum from Jacob Lew, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Apr. 7, 2011) (on file with the
Hofstra Law Review).
58. See infra Part IV.
59. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 799, 813-24 (1995). See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008).
60. See infra Part lV.C.
61. See infra Part lV.A.
62. See generally Civiletti Opinion, supra note 57.
63. Id. at 1-12.
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the basic rationale for furloughing large numbers of federal employees. 64
The Anti-Deficiency Act65 precluded allowing federal employees to
work without pay.66 Otherwise, their rightful demands for appropriated
pay-necessitating deficiency appropriations-force Congress to
appropriate what it had not.6 7 This was a relatively new and tenuous
interpretation. Traditionally, agencies continued functioning during
appropriation lapses, confident that Congress would end the lapse and
provide retroactive funding.
68
In addition to regulating general obligations in advance of
appropriations, the Anti-Deficiency Act further provides that: "No
officer or employee of the United States shall accept voluntary service
for the United States or employ personal service in excess of that
authorized by law, except in cases of emergency involving the safety of
human life or the protection of property., 69 Hence, agencies must send
their employees home.
However, the Anti-Deficiency Act has some potentially wide-open
exceptions for "emergency" non-furloughed employees. The second
prohibition contained in the Anti-Deficiency Act bars acceptance of
"voluntary service" for the United States except in cases of emergency
involving the safety of human life or the protection of property; the
prohibition entered the statute in 1884 to prevent unauthorized regular or
overtime service followed by claims for compensation.7 °
The Civiletti Opinion found a congressional intention to treat this
broadly.71 That opinion gave some suggestive examples. 72 Among the
examples were: FBI criminal investigations; legal services by the
Department of Agriculture, in connection with state meat inspection
programs and enforcement of the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967; and,
protection and management of commodity inventories by the
64. Id. at 1-2.
65. See 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1976).
66. § 665(b); CLINTON T. BRASS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SHUTDOWN OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS 3-4 (2014).
67. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS
LAW 6-9 (2d ed. 1992).
68. BRASS, supra note 66, at 4.
69. § 665(b).
70. See Civiletti Opinion, supra note 57, at 7-8.
71. Id. at 6. As in the other section of the statute, the Office of the Attorney General ("OAG")
focused on the exception, here for cases of emergency. Id. at 7-8. Based on a language change in
1950 and administrative construction of a related statutory provision that uses the same language,
the OAG construed the emergency exception broadly, to require only a reasonable relationship
between the possible harm to life or property and the funded activity. Id. at 6-8.
72. Id. at 10.
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Commodity Credit Corporation.73 Also, the Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB") memorandum included tax collection.74 Thus, not only
could the Veterans Administration continue to operate hospitals and air
traffic controllers to direct planes, but building guards, food inspectors,
and law enforcement officials could also continue to perform their
services, even in the absence of an appropriation. 5 Still, these examples
all dealt with problems so immediately serious that they require
employees on duty from Day One.
The Civiletti Opinion expressed what this Article describes as the
static view of shutdown-to decide, based on what shuts down on Day
One of the appropriations lapse, what shuts down at all as the
appropriations lapse continues.76 This made sense only in the original
context of the Civiletti Opinion. The opinion naturally focused on the
immediate shutting down on Day One, for that was murky enough, and
required, by far, the most advance planning and guidance.77 The Civiletti
Opinion did not need to go to a hypothetical later moment and speculate
what problems might get worse by then.
Then, from 1995 to 1996, the "train wreck" occurred. 78 The
Gingrich House imposed a government-wide lapse in appropriations to
pressure President Bill Clinton into acceding to its budget program.79 For
twenty-one days, the government shut down.80 As with the Civiletti
Opinion, the 1995-1996 train wreck resulted in the provision of guidance
from the new Justice Department8l and OMB, 2 the opinions of which
were along the same lines, having a static view of shutdown-the
criteria for what shut down on Day One largely continued as the days
went on.
8 3
73. Id.
74. Id. at 10-11.
75. See, e.g., id. at 7-10.
76. Id. at 1-4.
77. See id. at 1-3.
78. Chad Pergram, Breakdancing Around Nitroglycerin, Fox NEWS (Sept.
29, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/09/29/breakdancing-around-nitroglycerin; see
Krishnakumar, supra note 7, at 156.
79. Krishnakumar, supra note 7, at 156.
80. Glen Kessler, Lessons from the Great Government Shutdown of
1995-1996, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fact-checker/2011/02/
lessonsfrom thegreat govemm.html.
81. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen. 1 (Aug. 16, 1995) (on file
with the Hofstra Law Review).
82. Memorandum from Jacob Lew, supra note 57, at I.
83. Memorandum of Walter Dellinger, supra note 81, at 1-2, 4, 8-9. A few exceptions did
occur. Notably, the Social Security Administration initially sent home its tens of thousands of
employees who answer questions from, and give help to, the public. Initially, that agency reasoned
it only needed to keep the Social Security checks moving, since that mattered from Day One. See
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2. 2011 to 2013
From 2011 to 2013, the Obama Administration prepared for
shutdowns.84 OMB issued two advisory bulletins, roughly in line with
the Civiletti Opinion and the process followed in the 1995-1996 train
wreck.85 Pursuant to these bulletins, each agency published its own plan
for what and how to shut down on their website. 86 Then, for
approximately two weeks, the Administration shut down the
government.8 All this followed, more or less, the guidance from the
Civiletti Opinion and the 1995-1996 train wreck.88
However, during the shutdown, it became evident that problems
would worsen at a substantial number of agencies. 89 Agencies might get
by the first couple of days, but problems would pile up later. The
Defense Department posed an extreme example. 90 Following the
Civiletti Opinion and the 1995-1996 train wreck, the armed forces
stayed on duty, but a large fraction of the Defense Department civilians
did not.91
This was a problem Congress recognized. It sped through a brief
statute that let the Defense Department pay civilians who were necessary
for support of the troops.92 Strikingly, the Defense Department did not
merely figure out what the troops immediately and urgently needed for
support. Rather, the Defense Department paid a large number of the
civilians it had furloughed-approximately 350,000 civilians.93
History of SSA 1993-2000, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssa/
ssa2000chapterl.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). However, as the shutdown lasted, the Social
Security Administration realized the bafflement, and even fear, resulting from its not responding
adequately to inquiries. See id. In effect, the agency pioneered a dynamic view. On the first day of
the lapse, the problem of responding to the public might not rise to the level of urgency requiring
the advisory employees to remain at their post. Afterwards, though, the agency saw that the problem
did rise, in fact, to the level of urgency and it brought the employees back. Id.
84. See generally Memorandum from Jacob Lew, supra note 57.
85. See BRASS, supra note 66, at 23. See generally Memorandum from Jacob Lew, supra note
57.
86. BRASS, supra note 66, at 11.
87. Id. at 3.
88. See generally Civiletti Opinion, supra note 57.
89. See Impact of a Government Shutdown, supra note 4 (describing the effects the shutdown
will have on a number of agencies).
90. See Craig Whitlock, Hagel: Pentagon Lawyers Hoping to Minimize how Many
Defense Workers Are Furloughed, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/hagel-pentagon-lawyers-hoping-to-minimize-how-many-defense-wrkers-
are-furloughed/2013/10/01/87cbff96-2a7f-1 I e3-97a3-ff2758228523_story.html.
91. Id.
92. Ed O'Keefe, Obama Signs Bill Ensuring Military Pay During a Shutdown, WASH. POST
(Sept. 30, 2013, 10:54 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics-live/liveblog/live-
updates-the-shutdown-showdown/?id=2ad125d7-98a9-4165-a6fc-d4 lb43aa87fa.
93. Craig Whitlock, Pentagon to Recall Most Furloughed Workers, Hagel Says, WASH. POST,
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Moreover, virtually no one criticized the Defense Department for doing
so. The Pentagon successfully rejected the static view that it only
mattered what troops needed on Day One.94 Rather, the Pentagon took
the dynamic view that the problem of defense civilians not doing longer-
term tasks would worsen if no action was taken. 95
Examples of the dynamic developments in worsening problems
accumulated during the shutdown. The National Institutes of Health
postponed, in the first days, their start of new drug trials.96 Whatever the
limited effect on the first days, over time, cancer patients desperate to try
potential treatments made their angst felt.
97
The IRS idled over ninety percent of its employees, and that did not
create an acute situation for the first day. 98 Yet, over time, idling the IRS
staff-whose help to process refunds-would increasingly strain needy
taxpayers who depend on getting refunds. Health and safety agencies,
from the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") down to the
Chemical Safety Board, might skip work the first day.99 Over time, the
inspection of risky permittees and sites of current disasters would drop,
the evidence would get more difficult to follow, and the threats and risks
would multiply.
B. Dynamic Approach
In short, the experience in 2013 supported a dynamic view for
bringing employees back to work. Moreover, if agencies adopted a
pragmatic view of precedents, a dynamic approach would not be
inconsistent. Certainly, the Civiletti Opinion focused heavily on the Day
One situation. l00 The Civiletti Opinion took a narrow view of what
Oct. 5, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/pentagon-to-recall-most-furioughed-workers-
hagel-says/2013/10/05/eb7ed346-2deb- 11e3-8ade-al f23cdal35e story.
94. See Impact of a Government Shutdown, supra note 4; Whitlock, supra note 93.
95. See Jim Garamone, Half of DOD Civilians Will Be Furloughed if Appropriations Lapse,
U.S. DEP'T DEF. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120874; infra
Part II.B.
96. Joel Achenbach, NIH Trials Turn Away New Patients as Shutdown Obstructs Work
of Scientists, Researchers, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/shutdown-sequestration-cuts-zap-scientists-and-researchers/2013/10/02/bdfbO896-
2ab6-11e3-b139-02981 ldbb57f story.html.
97. See Brad Plumer, The Shutdown Could Prevent Kids with Cancer from Getting Treatment,
WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/01/the-
shutdown-could-prevent-kids-with-cancer-from-getting-treatment.
98. Impact of a Government Shutdown, supra note 4 ("About 88 percent of the 110,000
employees working for Treasury Department agencies will be placed on furlough, including nearly
90 percent of the IRS workforce.").
99. See, e.g., Plumer, supra note 5.
100. Civiletti Opinion, supra note 57, at 8-9.
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constituted immediate necessity.101 But, it did not discuss the context
presented after a few weeks of shutdown, or what would become
necessary if no action were taken for such an interval.
10 2
As for the 1995-1996 train wreck, it lasted for twenty-one days.
10 3
It stands as a precedent that appropriation lapses do lead to shutdowns
that idle a substantial fraction of the federal workforce for a few
weeks. 10 4 But, it did not establish a rule for negating any dynamic view.
Rather, it left open the possibility that starting after a number of days,
and especially after a couple of weeks, the government could take a view
of the situation for starting agencies up. The Civiletti Opinion itself laid
the groundwork for a very broad view of the "safety" exception to
shutting down.t15
It began by contrasting earlier statutory language with the modem
version. 0 6 The Civiletti Opinion went on to show the logic of non-
furloughed employees having a connection with safety or property.'0 7
Then, the Civiletti Opinion bolstered this broadening view with
interpretation by OMB and its predecessor. 0 8 With this legal support,
101. Id. at 8-10.
102. See generally id.
103. Kessler, supra note 80.
104. See Erb, supra note 16; Kessler, supra note 80.
105. Civiletti Opinion, supra note 57, at 9-11. The Civiletti Opinion stated:
Activities for which deficiency apportionments have been granted on this basis include
Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal investigations, legal services rendered by the
Department of Agriculture in connection with state meat inspection programs and
enforcement of the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695, the protection
and management of commodity inventories by the Commodity Credit Corporation, and
the investigation of aircraft accidents by the National Transportation Safety Board.
These few illustrations demonstrate the common sense approach that has guided the
interpretation of § 665(e).
Id. at 10.
106. According to the Civiletti Opinion:
In 1950, however, Congress enacted the modem version of the Antideficiency
Act... [Officials] proposed that "cases of sudden emergency" be amended to "cases of
emergency," "loss of human life" to "safety of human life," and "destruction of
property" to "protection of property." These changes were not qualified or explained by
the report accompanying the 1947 recommendation or by any aspect of the legislative
history of the general appropriations act for fiscal year 1951, which included the modem
§ 665(b).
Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 9-10. The Civiletti Opinion continued by stating that:
Consequently, we infer from the plain import of the language of their amendments that
the drafters intended to broaden the authority for emergency employment. In essence,
they replaced the apparent suggestion of a need to show absolute necessity with a phrase
more readily suggesting the sufficiency of a showing of reasonable necessity in
connection with the safety of human life or the protection of property in general.
Id. at 9.
108. Id. at 9-11. In regard to OMB, the Civiletti Opinion stated:
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the Civiletti Opinion laid out examples of activities that should not shut
down even on Day One. 109
Additionally, the Civiletti Opinion stressed that Congress had not
responded to the broadening view with any change in the statute." 0 This
background supports a dynamic view. "Safety of human life" requires
some kind of health and safety activity from Day One, such as
agriculture's work with state meat inspection and aircraft accidents."'
Moreover, it requires resuming health and safety activity for which the
problems accumulate over time, like those of polluting permittees
watched by the EPA."12
Two objections warrant consideration. First, from the presidential
viewpoint, taking a dynamic view might reduce some of the pressure to
end shutdowns. With the worst problems getting resolved by bringing
employees back, Congress might feel less public pressure to end the
remaining shutdown.
But, neither from 1995 to 1996, nor in 2013, did the public seem in
the slightest degree susceptible to indifference about the overall
undesirability of a federal shutdown. 1 3 Media reports of specific
instances of disorder in the administrative operations, or loss or risk due
to idled agencies, provided a focus for public indignation. 1 4 Still, the
This interpretation is buttressed by the history of interpretation by the Bureau of the
Budget and its successor, the Office of Management and Budget, of 31 U.S.C. §
665(e) .... [They] have granted dozens of deficiency reapportionments under this
subsection in the last 30 years, and have apparently imposed no test more stringent than
the articulation of a reasonable relationship between the funded activity and the safety of
human life or the protection of property.
Id. at 9-10.
109. Id. at 10.
110. Id. In discussing the broadening view, the Civiletti Opinion opined that:
Most important, under § 665(e)(2), each apportionment or reapportionment indicating
the need for a deficiency or supplemental appropriation has been reported
contemporaneously to both Houses of Congress, and, in the face of these reports,
Congress has not acted in any way to alter the relevant 1950 wording of § 665(e)(1)(B),
which is, in this respect, identical to § 665(b).
Id.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., id.; Joel A. Mintz, Government Shutdown and the EPA: Environmental Dangers
of Congressional Recklessness, HILL BLOG (Oct. 8, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/
congress-blog/energy-a-environment/327029-government-shutdown-and-the-epa-environmental-
dangers-of-congressional-recklesness.
113. Art Swift, Americans See Current Shutdown as More Serious than in '95, GALLUP (Oct.
4, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/I 65260/americans-current-shutdown-serious.aspx.
114. See, e.g., Jonel Aleccia, No Food Poisoning, Flu Surveillance During Shutdown, Federal
Health Agencies Say, NBC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2013, 12:32 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/kids-
health/no-food-poisoning-flu-surveillance-during-shutdown-federal-health-agencies-f8Cl 1308806;
Impact of a Government Shutdown, supra note 4; Kelli Wynn, Local People React to Government
Shutdown, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local-people-react-
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federal government carries out so many important activities that there
would continue to be plenty of focus for public alarm and anger even
with some mitigation of some specific problems.115
Second, from the Civiletti Opinion viewpoint, the text itself of the
Anti-Deficiency Act might seem to require a kind of Day One
immediacy.' 1 6 The Anti-Deficiency Act itself does make it hard to
imagine keeping most federal employees active on Day One.117 But, as
days go by, the problems from an idled federal workforce do affect
"persons" and "property." The safety agencies-like the EPA-guard
"persons" against health threats that are just as real as forest fires, albeit
developing more slowly.118 And, the IRS's failure to process refunds
affects needy taxpayers in their "property" against personal problems
that are just as real as weather disasters, affecting a much larger number
of people in a way that may be individually less devastating, but is
nevertheless collectively problematic." 9
III. DEBT LIMIT
This Part starts by laying out the problem of hitting the debt
ceiling.120 It summarizes the President's power to deal with the problem,
recognizing that this power does not include borrowing without
Congress's approval. 21 Rather, the Executive Branch takes advantage of
how the river of its disbursements actually divides itself into more
manageable sub-parts, some of which could be withheld in an
emergency. 122 The President might require an accelerated deposit of
some tax payments. 1
23
to-govemment-shutdown/nbcCFX (last updated Oct. 1, 2013).
115. See Dan Balz & Scott Clement, Poll: Major Damage to GOP After
Shutdown, and Broad Dissatisfaction with Government, WASH. POST,
Oct. 22, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-major-damage-to-gop-after-shutdown-
and-broad-dissatisfaction-with-the-government/2013/10/21/dae5cO62-3a84-1 le3-b7ba-
503fb5822c3e story.html.
116. Civiletti Opinion, supra note 57, at 7-8; see 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1976).
117. § 665.
118. See Mintz, supra note 112.
119. See Michael Wayland, Another Government Shutdown Effect: Slowed 2014 Tax Season
May Cause Service-Need Spike, NONPROFIT Q. (Oct. 24, 2013, 2:56 PM),
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/23131 
-another-government-shutdown-effect-
slowed-2014-tax-season-may-cause-service-need-spike.html.
120. See infra Part 1II.A.
121. See infra Part III.C.
122. See infra Part III.D.
123. See infra Part IIE; see also Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 19, at 1211-12
("[The President] could, for example, simply instruct the tax authority to increase withholding on all
regular paychecks, under the income tax or the Social Security and Medicare taxes.").
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A. Sequence of Hitting the Debt Ceiling: In Theory and in 2013
In order to borrow funds to finance the deficit, Congress delegates
authority to the Treasury to borrow up to a debt ceiling, which is known
as the debt limit.124 As the total debt rises toward the debt limit,
Congress must enact a law to raise that limit. 25 If Congress does not
raise the limit, the Treasury cannot borrow. 1
26
Once the Treasury cannot borrow, the Treasury will quickly run out
of the money needed to pay its combined obligations. A temporary delay
in paying government obligations to beneficiaries of programs
like Social Security differs from a debt default. A government that does
not pay the interest on its debt goes into credit collapse in a very
disastrous way.121
For both the national economy and the world economy, a debt
default by the United States creates a catastrophe. The formal credit
rating of, and the informal confidence in, the U.S. government plunges
immediately. 128 This crisis in business and international confidence
deal the gravest possible shocks to the national economy, and even the
world economy. Just from that shock, a national or even a world
recession may ensue.
As a prestigious committee advised in 2011, among "damaging
consequences" from "even a technical default:"
[F]oreign investors, who hold nearly half of outstanding Treasury
debt, could reduce their purchases .... A sustained 50 basis point
increase in Treasury rates would eventually cost U.S. taxpayers an
additional $75 billion each year.
[E]ven an extended delay in raising the debt ceiling, could lead to a
downgrade of the U.S. sovereign credit rating....
[T]he financial crisis ... could trigger a run on money market
funds ....
[A] Treasury default could severely disrupt the $4 trillion Treasury
financing market, which could.., possibly lead to another acute
deleveraging event.
[T]his deleveraging event would have damaging consequences for
the still-fragile recovery of our economy.129
124. Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 19, at 1183-88.
125. See Montgomery & Helderman, supra note 10.
126. Krishnakumar, supra note 7, at 157-58, 160.
127. Yalman Onaran, A U.S. Default Seen as Catastrophe Dwarfing Lehman's Fall,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-10-07/a-u-s-default-seen-
as-catastrophe-dwarfing-lehman-s-fall.html.
128. See id.
129. Letter from Matthew E. Zames, Chairman, Treasury Borrowing Advisory Comm., to
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Starting from that point, interest rates on Treasuries may rise
sharply from lost confidence, especially abroad, either immediately or
eventually, 130 thereby increasing the already-high portion of American
revenues annually siphoned off merely to pay debt service. Creditor
nations holding hundreds of billions of dollars in Treasuries, like China
and Japan, may irrevocably decide to diversify at least a portion of their
holdings. As such nations and other holders of Treasuries try to sell off
their Treasuries, a serious weakening of the dollar ensues. This makes
the United States the unfortunate poster-child for financially weak
nations. The bad effects worsen and persist for many years.
All of the aforementioned issues merely concern the failure to pay
interest on the debt. But, also, the United States would fail to timely pay
its creditors and entitlement beneficiaries, such as contractors and Social
Security recipients, respectively.1
31
Like rapidly falling dominoes, the failure to make payments on
federal programs has severe knock-on effects. As Pentagon contractors
do not receive expected payments, they consider slowing down their
activity and laying off workers. 132 As millions of Social Security
beneficiaries do not receive expected payments, they individually
experience personal hardships. 33 They also curtail some of their
spending as consumers. 134 Great harm befalls the economy as business
and consumer confidences alike receive a great shock.
Until recent decades, Congress could fulfill, without great
difficulty, its duty to raise the debt limit to accommodate borrowing.'
35
Recently, that action has become increasingly controversial.
13
Challengers running for Congress cite the many trillions of dollars of
Timothy Geithner, Sec'y, Dep't of the Treasury 1-2 (Apr. 25, 2011) (on file with the Hofstra Law
Review).
130. Ironically, in the very short term, interest rates on long-range U.S. bonds may, well, drop.
These are taken by the world as the safe haven in any crisis-even a crisis in the United States.
However, over time, the short-term purchasing for safe haven purposes would give way to medium-
term massive selling as the market moves to price in the new, much lower U.S. credit rating.
131 . See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 38, at 283-84.
132. Whitlock, supra note 93 ("Moreover, Hagel's decision could bring some relief to
thousands of private contractors who work for the Defense Department but had faced the threat of
layoffs because of the government shutdown.").
133. See, e.g., Solomon & Strumpf, supra note 24 ("Sucking money out of the economy by not
paying... Social Security-many seniors rely on those checks for most of their income-would
hamper growth.").
134. See Robert Gallardo & Al Myles, The Economic Impact of Social
Security, DALY YONDER (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.dailyyonder.com/economic-impact-social-
security/2011/12/18/3649.
135. Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 19, at 1184-85.
136. Id.; Constitutional Law, supra note 25, at 867-69.
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debt.'37 They blame the other party in general elections; the Tea Party
candidates also blame less extreme figures in their own party
primaries. 13  They blame these political "fall guys" for supposedly
facilitating massive spending, which they characterize as caused by
raising the debt ceiling itself.1
39
In the past, Congress used several approaches to mitigate the
difficulty of the controversial vote to raise debt limits. 40 Moreover, the
party of the Administration accepted a duty to its President to vote to
follow his recommendation in raising the debt.141 With the rise in 2010
of the Tea Party wing of the Republican House, the problem of getting
the House to vote for a debt limit increase became acute. 42 The Tea
Party wing felt the Democratic President should make major policy
concessions in order to get a debt limit increase. 143 In 2013, President
Obama categorically ruled that out.144
137. Susan Bonnell, 7th District Congressional Candidates Lance and Larsen Debate in
Advance of June 3 Republican Primary Election, THEALTERNATIVEPRESS.COM (May 29, 2014, 9:01
PM), http://www.thealternativepress.com/articles/7th-district-congressional-candidates-lance-and-1;
Mike Siegel, Congressional Candidate Phil Liberatore "Celebrates" Tax Day with a
Message for the IRS: "I'm Coming to Washington DC to Limit Your Power!," MIKESIEGEL.COM
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.mikesiegel.com/conservative-talk-radio-2/congressional-candidate-
phil-Iiberatore-celebrates-taz-day-with-a-message-for-the-irs-im-coming-to-washingtn-dc-to-limit-
your-power.
138. Olympia Snowe on Debt Ceiling Debate. 'I've Never Seen a Worse
Congress,' HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/10/olympia-snowe-debt-
ceiling-deal n 923348.html (last updated Oct. 10, 2011).
139. Id.
140. Plumer, supra note 6. The House had a "Gephardt rule" that automatically performed,
without a separate vote, the House's duty to raise the debt limit up to the level specified in the
annual budget resolution adopted by the House. Id.
141. See Fitts & Inman, supra note 26, at 1756. Most Congressional Democrats find it easier,
speaking in the very broadest terms, than Congressional Republicans, to raise the debt ceiling.
Buchanan & Doff, Bargaining, supra note 19, at 51. In many states and districts, most Democratic
voters do not attach so much blame to the vote to raise the debt limit. Such voters simply do not
believe the country could have a flat, zero deficit without unacceptably radical cuts in sacrosanct
entitlement programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Dauster, supra note 38, at
469,471,475,488,502.
142. See Shane Goldmacher, GOP Congressman Rips Tea Party Colleagues: 'I'm Not Sure
They're Republicans,' NAT'L J. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.nationaljoumal.com/congress/gop-
congressman-rips-tea-party-collegaues-i-m-not-sure-they-re-republicans-20131016. The Republican
House rejected the Gephardt rule. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE
THAN IT LOOKS: How THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 7 (2012). Moreover, the Republican majority party in the House felt no
strong loyalty to follow the Democratic President's recommendation in raising the debt.
Goldmacher, supra.
143. Donna Cassata & Martin Crutsinger, Boehner to Obama: No Debt Hike Without
Concessions, AP (Oct. 6, 2013, 2:21 PM), http://bigstom.ap.org/article/weekend-washington-yields-
little-shutdown.
144. Aaron Blake, Obama: I Will Not Negotiate on the Debt Ceiling, WASH. POST (Sept. 16,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/09/16/obama-i-will-not-
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The day-by-day events in 2013 depict how Congress really may let
the Treasury approach the calamity of hitting the debt ceiling. The
Treasury had announced it would hit the ceiling on October 17.141 On
October 15, under enormous pressure to avoid the impending disaster,
Speaker John Boehner caucused with his party. 146 His Tea Party wing
apparently stood absolutely firm. At first, the House Rules Committee
said it would prepare for a leadership bill on October 15.147 Presumably,
Speaker Boehner could devise a bill to have the party's backing and
could pass just in time.
However, on the evening of October 15, the House Rules
Committee announced it would not meet. 148 This meant the House
Republican party would not send a bill of its own to the House floor. At
this point, it appeared entirely possible that nothing would pass the
Congress on October 16, and the Treasury would hit the debt ceiling the
next day, on October 17. Hitting the ceiling seemed only too imminent at
that moment.
To understand what came so close to happening at that point, the
press said, at the time, that the true calamity would occur later than
October 17. 149 Although at that date the Treasury could no longer
borrow, the Treasury did have $30 billion in cash not yet spent.' 50 And,
revenues dribbled in-not on the scale of paying all of the Treasury's
combined obligations coming due-but still on the scale for paying a
substantial fraction.1
5
'
The press speculated that the Treasury may continue paying all
obligations, using cash on hand and incoming revenues, until some day
between October 22 and November 1.152 But, there was no way this
negotiate-on-the-debt-ceiling.
145. Plumer, supra note 6 ('We estimate that, at [Octotber 17], Treasury would have only
approximately $30 billion to meet our country's commitments'....").
146. Montgomery & Helderman, supra note 10; see Aliyah Frumin, Obama: Boehner 'Can't
Control His Caucus,' MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/hardball/obama-boehner-cant-control-his-
caucus (last updated Oct. 15, 2013, 6:33 PM).
147. House Rules Committee to Propose Debt Deal (CNBC television broadcast Oct. 15,
2013), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/video/cnbc/53288270#53288270.
148. Pete Kasperowicz, House Rules Panel Postpones Meeting on GOP Debt Bill, HILL BLOG,
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/328695-rules-committee-suspends-meeting-on-gop-bill
(last updated Oct. 15, 2013, 7:02 PM).
149. Christopher Matthews, When Will US. Actually Run Out of Time on the Debt Ceiling?,
TIME (Oct. 8, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/10/08/when-will-u-s-actually-hit-the-debt-
ceiling.
150. Id.
151. See Annie Lowrey, Tracing the Calendar Down to the Last Cent, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2013, at A18.
152. Id; Matthews, supra note 149.
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would go past October 30.153 On November 1, huge obligations came
due that went far beyond even an optimist's view of what the Treasury
could pay.' 54 Very bad things would happen between October 17 and a
week later. 155 Once the world press reported that the United States may
not borrow and would soon default, world business confidence would
suffer, and the economic consequences of defaulting on the combined
obligations would hit.
56
On October 16, Speaker Boehner gave in to public pressure and
impending calamity. 157 He brought to the House floor the compromise
proposal that the majority and minority party had put through the
Senate. 158 It passed the House, but with only about forty percent of the
House Republican Party supporting it together with the whole House
Democratic Party. 1
59
This did not make it seem, in retrospect, that the House had created
an illusion of the potential for a calamity. On the contrary, the House
Republican party really could not come together on a workable proposal,
and the House Republican party might have put off letting the other
party or the other chamber get a vote. There was no sign of a principle
that would universally protect the country from failing to meet its
combined obligations.
B. The Treasury's First Step: Putting Payment of
Interest Above All Else'
60
For the purpose of this Article, the question is a legal one regarding
what the Treasury does to respond to the chaotic condition after some
date that corresponds to what may be called "November 1," the date in
2013, when the Treasury stops paying a large part of its combined
153. Lowrey, supra note 151; Brad Plumer, A Very Simple Timeline for the Debt-Ceiling
Crisis, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/10/08/a-very-simple-timeline-for-the-debt-ceiling-crisis ("If... the Treasury Department
doesn't have enough money to make interest payments on the debt... due on Oct. 30... then we
could have a full-blown financial crisis.").
154. Lowrey, supra note 151.
155. Id.
156. Zachary Goldfarb, Long Debate Over Debt Ceiling Could Harm
Economy, Reports Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/long-
debate-over-debt-ceiling-could-harm-economy-report-says/2013/10/03/992c482e-2c35-11 e3-b 139-
02981 ldbb57fstory.html.
157. See Billy House, Senate Plans to Take First Vote on Debt Deal, House to Follow, NAT'L
J. (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.nationaljoumal.com/congress/senate-plans-to-take-first-vote-on-debt-
deal-house-to-follow-20131016.
158. See id.; Montgomery & Helderman, supra note 10.
159. Montgomery & Helderman, supra note 10.
160. DEBT LiMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 20.
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obligations. There is no magic cure. There is no abstruse, inscrutable,
constitutional doctrine by which the Treasury disburses all its
obligations. Once it cannot do so, serious problems develop in business
confidence and in the national and world economy. 16' Nothing said here
disputes or undermines the Obama Administration's position that hitting
the debt limit creates true and awful calamity, not to be reduced to
acceptable levels by whatever the Executive does at this point.'
62
Still, if and when that point comes, the Treasury will not fall down
like dead road kill. It will do what it can. Partly, the Treasury faces a
logistical question of what it can do, and partly, the Treasury faces a
legal question of what it has the authority to do. For there is one key goal
that the President may direct the Treasury to achieve even in the
"November 1" situation, as long as the President has the legal authority
and the Treasury has the logistical means.
While the Treasury cannot meet all of its obligations, it puts above
all, its goal to pay the interest on the national debt.' 63 In fact, the
Treasury, in 2011, headed toward putting interest first.' 64 The Treasury
does this even though the Treasury thereby intensifies its shortfall in
paying other obligations in a timely fashion. 65 That is, the Treasury pays
the interest even though it moves the Treasury even further away from
paying the rest of its combined obligations on time, including what the
government owes to its contractors, employees, Medicare providers, and
Social Security and veterans' beneficiaries. 66 Moreover, collectively,
the economy takes a hard blow from nonpayment to consumers of the
range of government obligations.
It may be asked, why it is prudent to do this, given the extremely
grave personal problems to beneficiaries resulting from not paying them
on time. 67 At this point, the Treasury cannot pay all of its combined
161. Goldfarb, supra note 156. Chairman Ben Bernanke stated that going past the debt ceiling
date "would no doubt have a very adverse effect very quickly on the recovery. I'm quite certain of
that." DEBT LIMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 19.
162. See Lowrey, supra note 151.
163. LEVIT ET AL., supra note 24, at 9.
164. Solomon & Strumpf, supra note 24.
165. See, e.g., Brad Plumer, If We Hit the Debt Ceiling, Can Obama Choose Which Bills to
Pay?, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/10/07/if-we-hit-the-debt-ceiling-can-obama-choose-which-bills-to-pay-2.
166. Id.
167. For example, millions of Social Security beneficiaries feel they have earned these
payments as a matter of right, to pay for food and shelter. Solomon & Strumpf, supra note 24.
Millions of food stamp recipients, including millions of children, need payments to avoid hunger.
Some might ask why the interest payments to relatively well-heeled persons, and to entities
including the Chinese government, take precedence over payments to millions of needy
beneficiaries. Id. ("Among the White House's concerns about prioritization is the political
consequences of paying Chinese debt holders ahead of veterans or Social Security recipients.").
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obligations, due to a political situation involving Congress. The choice
to pay interest differs qualitatively from prioritizing any other spending
over some other type of spending. First, a very, very short delay in
paying beneficiaries does not have an instantly calamitous effect on
national economic prospects. If the crisis ends quickly, and full
payments to beneficiaries catch up quickly, the worst ill effects on the
beneficiaries do not last long. And, the adverse effect on the economy
may deliver a blow, but it also does not last long.
In contrast, an interest default--even though not for long-
produces a radical immediate downgrading with limited recovery.'68 The
creditworthiness of the United States, both formally through credit
ratings, and informally through the viewpoint of foreign and domestic
debt-holders, takes an enormous one-way blow even from a short
default. The Treasury will desire, above all else, to avoid such a default
on debt interest. The Treasury takes, as its mission, maintaining the
public credit of the United States. 169 By paying the interest, the Treasury
avoids the catastrophic event of a debt default, which, even for just the
day of "November 1," would shock the nation and the world with a
lasting loss of world confidence in American creditworthiness, and a
lasting discrediting of American debt.
Second, logistically, it turns out that the Treasury has fairly good
ways of putting separate interest payments first, compared with its
combined stream of three million payments to other creditors or
beneficiaries. 70 The Treasury keeps interest payments separate from all
other payments,' 71 making these through a different agency, the Bureau
of the Public Debt, 172 and a distinctly separate channel of payment 173 of
the banking system called Fedwire. 74 Moreover, the Treasury acts with
168. Letter from Matthew E. Zames, supra note 129, at 2; Solomon & Strumpf, supra note 24.
169. Department of the Treasury (TREAS), PERFORMANCE.GOV, http://www.performance.gov/
agency/department-treasury#overview (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
170. Brad Plumer, Which Bills Will Be Paid?, COURIER-J., Oct. 13, 2013, at H.1, H.3 ("One
possible way this might work is that the Bureau of the Public Debt would keep making payments to
bondholders through Fedwire, and Treasury would halt the computer systems that make payments
to other government agencies and vendors.").
171. The Treasury's Bureau of the Fiscal Service combines its million of non-interest
payments to creditors and beneficiaries. The Bureau of the Fiscal Service uses a mechanism called
the Automated Clearing House ("ACH"), to make the vast majority of disbursements other than for
interest on the debt. Overview, BUREAU FISCAL SERVICE, http://www.fms.treas.gov/ach/index.html
(last updated Mar. 14, 2014).
172. Zaring, supra note 29, at 210.
173. DEBT LIMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 20 ("Interest on the federal debt would likely be
prioritized in either scenario - it is paid on a separate computer system (FedWire)."). For a detailed
description of Fedwire, see FIN. MGMT. SERV., CASH MANAGEMENT MADE EASY 58-59 (2002). The
government makes its other electronic payments through the ACH. Id. at 56, 71.
174. Plumer, supra note 170, at H.3.
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the expectation that public, business, and international pressure will
reach overwhelming levels as to Congress, or even a recalcitrant group
like the Tea Party.
C. Executive Power and the "Public Credit"
Clause Executive Power
The Constitution gave Congress, not the President, the power to
borrow and spend.' 75 Moreover, the nation's history confirms that
distribution of powers. 176 Just as Congress decides the dimensions of
appropriations, so too does Congress decide the dimensions of
borrowing. 177 In previous eras, Congress authorized each individual
public debt offering. 78 Then, in the twentieth century, Congress let the
Secretary of the Treasury plan the specific debt offerings, but still set,
and periodically raised, an overall debt ceiling. 1
79
On the other hand, as with other congressional powers, the
President has a great deal of responsibility about execution. Congress
legislates, but the President has the executive power from the U.S.
Constitution. "0 For two centuries, the Fiscal Constitution has recognized
that the President supervises the administration of the laws, especially,
for relevant purposes, the fiscal laws.'
8
'
For example, Congress does have the power to decide the scale of
appropriations.1 2 Yet, OMB develops the President's budget proposals,
detailing how to spend overall sums on each program, project and
activity. 183 When Congress votes, OMB apportions the spending rate
over the fiscal year. 84 And, OMB divides up the line items of
appropriations into sums on each program, project, and activity. 5 The
issue here does not concern any contention that when Congress sets a
debt limit, the President may issue public debt over it. Rather, the issue
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-2.
176. Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 19, 1198-99.
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, § 9, cl. 7.
178. Krishnakumar, supra note 7, at 143.
179. Id. at 143-48.
180. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
181. See, e.g., Huq, supra note 1, at 796-97, 799 & n.101 (discussing the President's influence
and control over fiscal legislation).
182. Stith, Congress', supra note 1, at 1348-50.
183. The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget, OFF. MGMT.
BUDGET, http://whitehouse.gov/omb/organization-mission (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
184. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB CIRC. No. A-11,
PART 1: GENERAL INFORMATION 2-3 (2014).
185. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB CRc. NO. A-i 1,
PART 4: INSTRUCTIONS ON BUDGET EXECUTION 7-8 (2014); U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 12 (2005).
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concerns whether the President may control the mechanics of
disbursement and other distributions, the treatment of interest coming
due, the coordination with the Federal Reserve, and so forth, to mitigate
the effect of hitting the debt ceiling-matters Congress has not
controlled by legislation. 186 Other presidential powers come into play,
like the Commander-in-Chief clause as to defense management. 187
Section four of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Public Credit
Clause, represents a constitutional commitment against default: "The
validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law ... shall not be questioned.' ' 8
8
This Article does not seek to deduce from the Public Credit Clause
any sweeping principle that negates the debt ceiling. This Article does
not argue that the Constitution provides the President with the power to
borrow without Congress. The Public Credit Clause gets a nod here for a
relatively minor role: it underlines the constitutional support efforts, like
those discussed, to fend off chaos in a debt ceiling crisis.189 Frankly,
even without a mention of this clause, this Article does not change all
that much.
In any event, that Public Credit Clause had its origins in a post-
Civil War situation,' 90 with the clause blocking repudiation of the
Union's financing.' 9' And, the proponents of the Public Credit Clause
drafted it broadly. 92 As the Supreme Court commented on the one
occasion the Public Credit Clause came before it:
186. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 185, at 12-14.
187. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. A great deal of the spending relates to defense needs, handled by
payments by DFAS; the non-military spending needs presidential orchestration for it not to crowd
out defense needs. See Agency Overview, DEF. FIN. & ACCT. SERVICE, http://www.dfas.mil/
pressroom/aboutdfas.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). The President's Commander-in-Chief powers
do not let him spend or borrow without Congress. See U.S. CONST. art I1, § 2. But, those powers do
let him manipulate the mechanics of disbursement and the Federal Reserve's role to facilitate
defense. Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, From Vietnam to Desert Shield: The
Commander in Chief's Spending Power, 81 IOWA L. REV. 79, 97 (1995). For example, the great
Supreme Court case upholding borrowing activity took place regarding the greenbacks of the Civil
War. Ajit V. Pai, Congress and the Constitution: The Legal Tender Act of 1862, 77 OR. L. REV.
535, 538 & n.7 (1998).
188. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
189. See Public Debt of the United States Shall Not Be Questioned:
The 14th Amendment and the Debt Ceiling, DAILY KOs (Dec. 9, 2012, 10:00 AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/12/09/1168027/-Publc-debt-of-the-United-States-shall-not-be-
questioned-the- 14th-Amendment-and-the-debt-ceiling#.
190. After the Civil War, Northern Republicans feared that the representatives of the
reconstructed South would repudiate the debt taken on by the Union during the war. McCommas,
supra note 21, at 1305-09.
191. Id.; Adam Liptak, The 14th Amendment, the Debt Ceiling and a Way Out, N.Y. TIMES
(July 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/us/politics/25legal.html?_r=0.
192. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1934).
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While this provision was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put
beyond question the obligations of the government issued during the
Civil War, its language indicates a broader connotation. We regard it
as confirmatory of a fundamental principle .... Nor can we
perceive any reason for not considering the expression 'the validity of
the public debt' as embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the
public obligations. 193
In modem terms, economists today would say that the Abraham
Lincoln Administration monetized the federal debt.194 It financed the
Civil War, not by selling debt instruments, but by using greenbacks as
an expanding part of the money supply.195 So, the Public Credit Clause
reflects, condones, and supports bold tactics for handling the fisc, of
which the monetization of federal debt is a prime example.1
96
So long as the Executive Branch does not issue public debt, this
suggests the Federal Reserve has broad authority to expand the money
supply and, in a way, to monetize the amount of additional needs when
the debt limit precludes straightforward issuance of public debt.197 The
distributions this Article discusses come from expansion of the Federal
Reserve's balance sheet, to get lending to those left out, because no
public debt borrowing making disbursements to them may occur. The
Federal Reserve can make these distributions, in the form of loans,
because its loans increase its balance sheet, but do not increase the
public debt. This Federal Reserve balance sheet expansion, looked at
another way, simply expands the nation's money supply at a propitious
moment. From the perspective of the Federal Reserve's monetary
193. Id. Looking closely at the clause's background, the Northern Republicans feared that
members of Congress from the South might oppose paying the massive Civil War debt, particularly
because they wanted to pay the war debt of the individual southern states and perhaps even the debt
of the Confederacy. McCommas, supra note 21, at 1305-09. Those Northern Republicans sought to
protect, at that point, a matter of public credit far beyond American experience. Id. They had
financed the Civil War with massive issuance, as legal tender, of greenbacks that lacked the backing
of gold or silver. Ali Khan, The Evolution of Money: A Story of Constitutional Nullification, 67 U.
CIN. L. REv. 393, 424, 440-41 (1999).
194. See Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Civil War Finance: Lessons for Today, 12 CHAP. L. REV.
591,594-97,600 (2009); Kahn, supra note 193, at 440-41.
195. Hummel, supra note 194, at 600. For a discussion on monetization, see Roger L.
Torneden, Will Devaluation of the Dollar Pull the US. Out of Depression Once Again?, NEXUS:
CHAP. J.L. & POL'Y, 2009-2010, at 67, 81-82.
196. Liptak, supra note 191.
197. Terry Burnham, Is the Federal Reserve Printing a Free Lunch, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 17,
2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/federal-reserve-printing-free-lunch.
The presidential power translates in straightforward terms for Congress. On the one hand, the
President leaves to Congress the raising of the debt ceiling and the issuance of more public debt. On
the other hand, the President announces steps he will take, as part of his duty to protect the public
credit.
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concerns, such expansion buffers the economy against crisis, while not
at all counting as the issuance of public debt.198
The President can stretch his execution powers to the utmost.
Disbursement of funds in normal times may seem ministerial,
noncontroversial, or prosaic. In a debt ceiling crisis, the steps, in
disbursement of hundreds of billions of dollars monthly, take on real
significance in the separation of powers.
D. Dividing Up, More Manageably, the Stream of Disbursements
The big issue regarding the President's powers is not whether, in
the abstract, he has the legal authority to order the Treasury to divide up
the stream of payments. Rather, the Treasury faces whether its authority
may accomplish the goal as a practical matter. The Treasury takes the
position that its FMS lacks the logistical means to prioritize its three
million daily payments. 99 The Treasury-specifically its Bureau of the
Fiscal Service and FMS-have a torrent of payment requests; its website
explains that it annually "disburses more than a billion payments, with
an associated dollar value of more than $2.4 trillion.,,200 The Treasury
says that it "disburses approximately [eighty-five] percent of all federal
payments., 20 1 The difficulty posed by this huge daily stream of
payments will present the single biggest challenge to the President
mitigating the debt limit crisis.
Logistically, it may seem the FMS's enormously large-scale,
combined payment stream precludes turning anything important on or
off. However, the Treasury allows the fostering of an impression of
helplessness, which looks differently upon focusing on the facts. This
has great importance both because of what the Executive agencies may
do alone, and further, how the Federal Reserve may help them, as
discussed below.
20 2
Contrary to the impression the Treasury fosters, the Treasury alone
does not disburse all the government's payments, entirely by itself, in
one sole Treasury stream.20 3 The Treasury's figure of eighty-five percent
198. A Treasury cut back on payments, plus a nasty spill by consumer and business
confidence, produces a deflationary shock. Expansion of the Federal Reserve balance sheet zeroes
provides the best medicine for this deflationary shock.
199. Plumer, supra note 165 ("[T]he Treasury Department has long insisted that its payment
systems simply aren't set up for prioritization.").
200. All About Us: An Overview, supra note 42.
201. The Office of Legislative and Public Affairs: Fact Sheets, BUREAU FIsCAL SERVICE,
http://www.fins.treas.gov/news/factsheets/pmt-mgmt.html (last updated Mar. 14, 2014).
202. See infra Part N.A.
203. The Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, supra note 201.
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skirts two facts.2 °4 When the Treasury speaks more precisely, it says it
makes eighty-five percent of non-Department of Defense ("DoD")
payments, meaning its percentage of all payments falls considerably
below eighty-five percent.20 5 Moreover, for other reasons, the Treasury's
asserted eighty-five percent shrinks further when closely examined.20 6
Defense Finance and Accounting Services in the DoD makes its own
disbursements, completely unconnected to the stream of disbursements
by the Treasury.0 7
The Division of Payment Management, for the CMS, in the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") processes huge
separate streams of disbursement. 0 8 In HHS, CMS's accounting system
has "45 million providers and beneficiaries '20 9 and will "[p]ay nearly 3
Million healthcare claims a day., 210 In one year, CMS processed
"approximately $600 billion in total payments/disbursements. 21' It may
204. See id.
205. FIN. MGMT. SERV., supra note 173, at 44 ("A few Federal agencies issue their own
payments, most notably the Department of Defense []. However, the Financial Management Service
[] issues approximately 85 percent of all Federal Government payments for most of the other
agencies." (emphasis added)).
206. Treasury counts its percentage by the number of disbursements, which provides it with a
high figure since it makes millions of relatively non-large payments to Social Security beneficiaries.
See Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 2010, SSA.GOV, http://www.ssa.gov/
policy/docs/chartbooks/fastfacts/2010/fastfactslO.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2015); The Office of
Legislative and Public Affairs, supra note 201. Payments for government contracts and medical
providers may get largely or wholly processed by DFAS and CMS. Agency Overview,
supra note 187. CMS's recipients, such as health care providers, have higher average
disbursements so that Treasury has a lower percentage of federal payments by amount, than of
federal payments, by numbers of payments. Administrative Program Accounting, CMS.GOV,
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Computer-Data-and-Systems/HIGLAS/
Administrative ProgramAccounting.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2013, 5:22 PM).
207. See, e.g., Agency Overview, supra note 187.
208. FIN. MGMT. SERV., supra note 173, at 71. The Payment Management System is described
as being:
[O]perated by the Division of Payment Management (DPM) of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS).... [PMS] performs the following functions: . .. 4)
Transmit the authorization to the Federal Reserve Bank for ACH (next day)
payments... ; 5) Record the payment transactions and the corresponding disbursement
transactions.. .
Id.
209. Healthcare Integrated General Ledger Accounting System (HIGLAS), CMS.GOV,
http://cms.hhs.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Computer-Data-and-Systems/HGLAS
(last updated Apr. 2, 2013, 2:42 PM) [hereinafter HIGLAS].
210. Id.
211. Healthcare Integrated General Ledger Accounting System Highlights, CMS.GOV (Aug.
2013), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Computer-Data-and-Systems/
HIGLAS/Downloads/HIGLAS-Newsletter-August-2013.pdf. It is clear that DFAS makes its own
final disbursements; that is, it sends out the checks or electronic payments. FMS has sometimes not
been clear about CMS. In any event, CMS does all the processing of payment requests, all the way
to readiness to disburse.
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212be that CMS, in general, disburses its own payments. Effectively, the
trio of FMS, DFAS, and CMS split the government's disbursements into
a much more manageable trio of three separate streams.213
Treasury officials told the HHS's Inspector General how they might
respond in a debt limit crisis:
Delay of Payments
Treasury officials told us that it was the Department's organizational
view that the least harmful option available to the country at the time,
of these very bad options, was to implement a delayed payment
regime. In other words, no payments would be made until they could
all be made on a day-by-day basis.
2 14
A public interest group, the Bipartisan Policy Center's Debt Limit
Analysis, explained this more fully, as it explored a couple of scenarios:
Scenario #2: Make all of each day's payments together once enough
cash is available.
-Treasury might wait until enough revenue is deposited to cover an
entire day's payments, and then make all of those payments at once.
(For example, upon reaching the X date, it might take two days of
revenue collections to raise enough cash to make all of the payments
due on day one. Thus, the first day's payments would be made one day
late. This, of course, would delay the second day's payments to a later
day.)
-In the 2012 OIG report, some senior Treasury officials stated that
they believed this to be the most plausible and least harmful course of
action.215
212. FMS has commented on CMS's payment system, stating:
The Payment Management System (PMS) is operated by the Division of Payment
Management (DPM) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) .... The
system ... performs the following functions ... Receive payments requests ... Edit
these payment requests ... Transmit the authorization to the Federal Reserve Bank for
ACH (next day) payments or through the Treasury's Electronic Certification System for
Fedwire (same day) Payments ....
FIN. MGMT. SERV., supra note 173, at 71. This FMS guide seems to say that CMS makes its own
disbursements of the kind that go through ACH but sends the typically larger, more timely
disbursements through Treasury's Electronic Certification System for Fedwire. That may mean the
government has great control over these larger, timelier CMS payments, because Fedwire is a
separate rivulet of such payments compared to the millions of ACH payments.
213. There are other departments that have authority to make their own disbursements, but
these are the key ones. See, e.g., Farm Service Agency Disbursement Statements, FSA,
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/lntemet/FSA_File/disbsmt-statemts.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
214. TIGTA report, supra note 24, at 6.
215. DEBT LIMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 26.
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So, the government starts out with options. As stated, it can make all of
its disbursements on a segregated day-by-day basis.
21 6
The President, using his powers in this crisis, has a further option,
missed by the insufficiently detailed accounts to date.21 7 He can choose
to make segregated day-by-day disbursements from DFAS, CMS, or the
Treasury. For example, the government might conclude that for one
reason or another, it could hold off on CMS disbursements. 218
The Treasury has said it does not itself have, in-house, the capacity
to prioritize payments. 219 The payment requests come to the Treasury
and get combined, and the Treasury asserts it cannot prioritize the
ingredients of the combination.22 0 However, it does not answer the
question of whether the government can do anything; it just notes that
the Treasury cannot treat payments for different purposes differently
once it combines them. The Treasury cannot do the job itself, but
agencies might. As the Bipartisan Policy Center noted: "One other
mechanical possibility for the prioritization scenario is that Treasury (via
the OMB) would instruct agencies to withhold processing of
certain groups or types of bills so as to prevent them from entering
Treasury's system.",
221
Without knowing the complete answer to the feasibility of this
approach, it may be suggested that DoD, CMS, and the Treasury may
find ways to control the processing of agencies' requests for particular
categories of payment.222 Agencies engage in considerable processing
before they produce requests, grouped in schedules or batches, going to
the trio of the Treasury, DFAS, and CMS. 223 Agencies do transmit
216. Id. at 24.
217. See generally id.
218. Perhaps CMS providers will continue to provide services while awaiting payments. Or,
perhaps, the Federal Reserve fills the funding gap for providers. That allows the government to
husband its revenues for non-CMS uses. Furthermore, the President may try to have agencies divide
up their requests for payment in partial streams, and process some partial streams before others.
219. DEBT LtMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 20.
220. See id. at 20-26.
221. Id. at 25.
222. Technically, agencies provide certified requests of batches of payments. All About Us: An
Overview, supra note 42. These are agency requests for payment or disbursement, rather than
agencies themselves making payment or disbursement. Id. With these requests in hand, the
disbursing officers at Treasury's Fiscal Service-DoD's DFAS, and (probably) CMS's Payment
Management Service-then go ahead with disbursement, namely, payment either by electronic
transmission or by paper check. Id. ("Through [Treasury's Financial Management Service's] state-
of-the-art information technology systems, for example, agencies are able to submit certified
requests for payment disbursements, [and] determine the status of disbursements ....").
223. Detailed Information on the Financial Management Service Payments
Assessment, EXPECTMOR.E.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/
expectmore/detail/10004102.2005.ht ml (last updated Sept. 6, 2008). In regard to the payments
program:
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requests for disbursement in batches this way.224 This may create readily
separable streams of payment, like HHS's separate stream of grant
payments to states, or maybe even some of the Social Security stream of
beneficiary payments.
Take any large-scale set of payments. Military pay comes up in
schedules or batches, for disbursement on one set day per pay period. 5
DFAS may have some capacity to take military pay through to
disbursement while holding back all other DoD payments.226 If not, at
least DFAS may have some capacity to let military pay (for the pay
period) plus all other disbursements that same day go through to
payment while side-tracking other DoD payments due on other days. For
a monthly period used as a scenario during the 2013 crisis, military pay
and retirement costs $10 billion, whereas defense vendors cost $28
billion.227 When DFAS takes the pay of individuals through to
disbursement while holding back defense vendors, it gives the President
some logistical ability to handle DoD disbursements.
During the same period, out of a total of about $290 billion (minus
the two DoD categories above), Medicare and Medicaid, collectively,
cost $69 billion, most of which goes to health care providers. 8
If CMS has the logistical capacity to hold back the payment of
providers, it gives the President some logistical ability to handle civilian
government disbursements.
Still, this by no means constitutes all the ways for the President to
use his power in a debt limit crisis. This Article next discusses the tax
approach.229 Subsequently comes the large role of the Federal
The purpose of the payments program [of the Financial Management Service] is to issue
Federal payments on behalf of Executive Branch Federal Program Agencies (FPAs)
timely, efficiently, and accurately. FPAs certify payment schedules to FMS, which
initiates electronic payments and produces check payments as requested by the FPAs.
This includes a variety of payment types such as lifeline payments (benefit payments like
Social Security), vendor payments, and tax refunds.
Id.
224. Administrative Program Accounting, supra note 206. ("HIGLAS batched all approved
awards and transmitted them to the Payment Management System (PMS) for disbursement.").
225. 2014 Active Duty Pay Day Schedule, DEF. FIN. & AcCT. SERVICE, http://www.dfas.mil!
militarymembers/payentitlements/2014adpaydays.htm (last updated Jan. 6, 2014).
226. See, e.g., Obama Signs Bill to Ensure Military Will Be
Paid During Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/news/fiscal-crisis/201 3/09/30/obama-signs-bill-to-ensure-military-will-be-
paid-during-shutdown/?php--true&_type=blogs&_php-true& type=blogs&_r=3 (discussing which
military programs will continue to be funded in the event of a shutdown).
227. DEBT LIMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 22.
228. Id. at 22-23.
229. See infra Part III.E.
[Vol. 43:511
CONFRONTING CHAOS
Reserve. 230 During that discussion, the topic recurs of focusing on
particular separate streams of payments, such as to contractors and
providers. 23' The Federal Reserve may have the most important means to
mitigate the problem of stream of payments.
E. Advance Tax Deposit
A separate point warrants attention. The rest of this Article
concerns how to deal with the debt limit by management of
distributions.232 However, the President may have some means to
accelerate revenue at the period of crisis. While Congress decides on tax
legislation, Congress and the courts leave great discretion for the
Treasury to administer the tax system.233 This Article picks a particular
example of how to do so, but solely to illustrate the kind of thing that the
Treasury may do. The example's purpose is to make the notion of
speeding up revenues concrete. It may well be that other examples
would work as well or better.
Statutorily, Congress enacted 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), 234 a sweeping
general grant of power for the Treasury to adopt regulations. In 2011, in
an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, a unanimous Supreme
Court bolstered the Treasury's power in Mayo Foundation for Medical
Education and Research v. United States. 23 5 In Mayo Foundation, the
Court held that the Treasury regulations deserve a highly deferential
standard.2 36  Of course, this becomes a context for maximum
employment of the President's broad powers on the details of execution.
For example, Congress leaves it to the Treasury to determine
certain details 237 as to when 238 corporate taxpayers perform their
230. See infra Part W.A.
231. See infra Part [V.A.
232. See infra Part IV.C.
233. Clifford M. Sloan et al., Supreme Court's Mayo Foundation Opinion Grants Chevron
Deference to Treasury Regulations, TAX EXECUTIVE, Spring 2011, at 35, 35, 40, available at
http://www.tei.org/news/articles/Documents/TTESpring 1 _MayoChevSloanWilliamsFoster.pdf
234. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (2012) (authorizing the Treasury Department to "prescribe all needful
rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the Internal Revenue Code).
235. 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
236. Id. at 713. Moreover, the Court accorded that the Chevron standard should even be
applied to regulations derived from the Treasury's umbrella grant of power for all its regulations,
and not just to regulations in which Congress enacted a specific statutory section emphatically
authorizing regulations for a specific statutory tax program. Id. at 713-14.
237. Commentators have noted the significance of the Treasury changing its regulations to
control quarterly estimated corporate taxes. See Jonathan D. Bush, New Changes to the
Annualization Method for Determining Estimated Taxes, CORP. TAX'N, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 3, 8.
238. The Treasury provides procedures for businesses to obtain an advance refund
payment. How to Make the U.S. Treasury Work for You Up Close, GRANT THORNTON,
http://www.grantthomton.codstaticfiles/GTCom/files/Industries/Consumer/ 2O&52Oindustrial%20
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quarterly estimates.239 With the Treasury in trouble, it may use the same
kind of authority to obtain an advance deposit. To deal with the debt
limit crisis, the President may direct the Treasury to see that corporations
deposit, presently, their next due quarterly tax estimated payment. That
is, if the next date for quarterly estimates is January 15, and the crisis
hits in late October, the Treasury may issue a call for deposit of the
funds on November 1 or November 5.240
Opponents of this move may protest this effort. Some in Congress,
or in the business world, might paint the call for deposits as a usurpation
of taxation powers belonging exclusively to the legislature.24' The
Treasury may disarm the opposition242 by putting it, to a large measure,
to the business community itself to decide which to do.243 The deciding
factor, to encourage businesses actually to get the deposits in, may lie in
the following Parts of this Article that discuss the role of the Federal
Reserve.244 Few will appreciate better than the business community the
peril of the moment, and the need to follow the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve as they lead toward safety--especially when it costs a firm
nothing.245 And so, with that particular example of the Federal Reserve's
products/IRS%20Procedures%20for/o2Ocash-starved%20businesses%20TRANSPORT.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015). This supports a weakened economy. Id. ("As a result of the unanticipated
downturn in the economy during 2008, many companies are finding they have overpaid their
estimated taxes substantially .... [A] corporation can file Form 4466 and receive a 'quick refund' of
overpaid estimated tax.").
239. General Instructions, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1120w/ch01.html (last visited
Feb. 15, 2015) (noting that "installments generally are due by the 15th day of the 4th, 6th, 9th, and
12th months of the tax year").
240. The Treasury Department will simplify all the details by emergency regulation. To avoid
calculation problems, corporations will have a "safe harbor" if they deposit eighty percent of their
most recent quarterly payment.
241. The current statutory provision regarding the penalty for failure to make payments says
nothing about the making of any deposits, just payments, and it sets forth specific dates each quarter
for payments. 26 U.S.C. § 6655 (2000). Opponents can make a straightforward case that the
Treasury lacks any authority to make a move that resembles accelerating the statutorily fixed dates
for quarterly payments.
242. Although this is a legal issue, the key audience for this issue consists of a legally-
informed business community, rather than courts. The fast pace of the debt crisis, compared to the
crawling speed of the exhaustion and jurisdictional principles of tax cases, makes it quite
impractical for a high court to make a ruling that mattered on the large scale.
243. On the other hand, to build an approach with maximum support from the business
community, the Treasury may eschew threats or sanctions against firms that fail to follow the
guidance to make a timely deposit.
244. See infra Part N.A.
245. Compliant businesses-which make an early deposit of estimated quarterly taxes-may
receive an offsetting interest-free no-strings loan, in the amount of their tax deposit, from a lending
facility of the Federal Reserve. With the right hand, they deposit the cash in the Treasury; with the
left hand, they receive it from the Treasury, and the Federal Reserve may make it easier than that.
The corporate fiscal officer could simply tell a Federal Reserve lending facility to make the deposit
on behalf of the corporation. For the corporation, it is an inconsequential accounting procedure. The
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powers to get the nation through this crisis, this Article turns to the
Federal Reserve.
IV. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO HITTING THE DEBT LIMIT CEILING
A. Enter the Federal Reserve
246
The Federal Reserve is, of course, the nation's central bank.147 To
guide the economy, it buys and sells securities, including Treasuries, on
a massive scale, thereby regulating the size of the money supply.2 48 To
fund these activities, it does not borrow.249 It has the power to create
funds by entering their creation on its books, using these bank-created
deposits as its funding.25 ° Its creation of these funds does not have any
effect on the national debt, and specifically does not raise the debt to the
debt ceiling.25 1
Traditionally, it has the function and the very broad legal authority
to step in during financial crises and function as the "lender of last
resort. 252 In the financial crisis of 2008, and the ensuing years of
recession and high unemployment, the Federal Reserve demonstrated the
scale and range of its powers as the lender of last resort. One key
measure was that the Federal Reserve had a balance sheet of $1 trillion
during the crisis.253 By ordinary reckoning, it expanded its balance sheet
to $3.6 trillion in late 2013.254 As cited by Colleen Baker, "Bloomberg
News estimates that the Federal Reserve's assistance to the financial
transaction would not make a dent in the corporation. This is part of the highly developed system
that the Treasury has created for corporate tax payments. See generally DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
ELECTRONIC FEDERAL TAX PAYMENT SYSTEM: FINANCIAL INSTITUTION HANDBOOK (2010),
available at http://fms.treas.gov/eftps/marketing/eflps handbook.pdf.
246. This Subpart is based on Baker, supra note 32, and Gabilondo, supra note 46.
247. Baker, supra note 32, at 81-82.
248. Id. at 82-83.
249. See, e.g., Ann Saphir, The Fed's QE3: How Does It Work and What
Are the Risks?, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/13/us-usa-fed-
easing-idUSBRE88C 1 CT20120913.
250. Baker, supra note 32, at 82-84.
251. What Is the Difference Between Monetary Policy and Fiscal Policy, and How Are They
Related?, BD. OF GOVERNORS FED. RES., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12855.htm
(last updated July 21, 2014).
252. Baker, supra note 32, at 84-87.
253. See Matt Phillips, The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet Will Hit a Mind-Boggling $4
Trillion any Day Now, QUARTZ (Dec. 13, 2013), http://qz.com/157198/the-federal-reserves-balance-
sheet-will-hit-a-mind-boggling-4-trillion-any-day-now (indicating the drastic increase in the Federal
Reserve's balance sheet since 2008).
254. Kjetil Malkenes Hovland, Fed's Evans Suggests Tapering Could Start Later than
October, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Sept. 27, 2013, 9:43 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/
2013/09/27/feds-evans-suggests-tapering-could-start-later-than-october.
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system reached approximately $7.7 trillion., 255 Clearly, its operations
have the scale to shore up the Treasury in a short-term debt limit crisis.
A second key measure was that in the financial crisis of 2008, and
after, the Federal Reserve demonstrated its flexibility as the lender of
last resort. 256 A series of key, non-bank firms, like Bear Steams and
AIG, faced financial collapse. Moreover, the market collapsed for
258certain categories of financial instruments. These ranged from money
market funds to commercial paper, and from short-term repurchase
agreements for financial assets ("repos") to mortgage-based securities.259
The Federal Reserve fought the crisis by creating "lending facilities," so
that the Federal Reserve could make loans to holders of these troubled
financial assets.260 The Federal Reserve accomplished its goal. It kept
the adverse financial and economic conditions from causing a complete
freeze and collapse of credit.261
What the Federal Reserve did in that kind of financial crisis
adumbrates what it may do in the credit crisis as the government hits the
debt ceiling. Hitting the debt ceiling, and signaling that the United States
hovers on the edge of a credit default, will strike the financial
community, both in the United States and in the world, like an
earthquake. The Federal Reserve's own historic mandate, not some
partiality for the FMS, DFAS, or CMS, calls it to take up arms against
262the crisis. In the face of a sudden, huge potential credit crisis, the
Federal Reserve's historic mandate drives it to the limits of the vast
scale, range, and flexibility of its powers.
As previously quoted, a prestigious advisory committee laid out the
danger posed by the shock of hitting the debt ceiling and the further
danger from a default on interest obligations.263 In taking action, the
Federal Reserve does not meddle officiously in the problems of others. It
does its own job.
Moreover, this Article does not propose that the Federal Reserve
nakedly make a loan to the Treasury or cancel Treasuries, as
255. Baker, supra note 32, at 78.
256. THE FEDERAL RESERVE, supra note 57, at 28-29.
257. Id. at 45.
258. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 27 (2011).
259. Id. at 27, 29-30.
260. These included emergency-liquidity programs for securities firms, corporations, money
market mutual funds, plus facilities to swap securities, buttress the repo market, and boost
commercial paper and money market mutual funds. Gabilondo, supra note 46, at 769-71.
261. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 258, at 386; Gabilondo, supra note 46, at 771.
262. Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2007-2008, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
239, 243-44, 254-55 (2008).
263. See supra text accompanying note 129.
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some have suggested.264 There would be questions about the statutory
authority for the Federal Reserve to make naked loans to the Treasury or
to cancel Treasuries. 65
Rather, the Federal Reserve may pursue the strategy of distributing
money to those temporarily not receiving similar money as a Treasury
disbursement. While the Treasury makes "disbursements" or
"payments," which constitute government spending, the Federal Reserve
makes "distributions," which puts cash in recipients' hands but which
nominally, until the debt crisis ends, may be deemed loans.266 That is,
the Federal Reserve lends on a no-strings, interest-free basis to those
entitled to, but potentially lacking assurance of, immediately receiving
government payment. The Federal Reserve would make a distribution
(termed a loan) for those to whom the Treasury does not make a
distribution (termed a payment or disbursement).
Recipients freely spend what they get. This Federal Reserve
distribution, in place of the Treasury distribution, buffers those delayed
creditors and payees from shock of the Treasury slowing down
payment. The Federal Reserve does not let a financial panic or
deleveraging event occur. That accords with how the Federal Reserve
acted in 2008 and thereafter.267
264. Alan Grayson, Dear Bernanke: Please Use Your Powers to End the Debt Limit Crisis,
Bus. INSIDER (Oct. 11, 2013, 6:45 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/bemanke-could-end-the-
debt-limit-crisis-2013-10.
265. For one thing, some would argue that the simplest, naked Federal Reserve loans to the
Treasury count as "public debts," which the Treasury cannot take above the debt ceiling. LEVIT ET
AL., supra note 24, at 1, 2 & n.8 (stating that "[a]lmost all of the federal government's borrowing is
subject to a statutory limit"). After all, ordinary Treasury bills, notes, and bonds held by the Federal
Reserve do count as public debt for purposes of the debt limit statute. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, FEDERAL DEBT: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5-7, 54-57 (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/243712.pdf. The list of entities to which the Federal
Reserve may lend is broad but does not expressly include the Treasury. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(a)
(2012); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES
AND FUNCTIONS 45-46, 49 (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/
pf complete.pdf. For the Federal Reserve to cancel some of its $2 trillion Treasuries outright, as
suggested by Alan Grayson, is quite a step to take-a last resort rather than a first resort. Grayson,
supra note 264. The various lending facilities discussed in this Article all entail a kind of lending
from the Federal Reserve to private entities, as has always been done and properly so.
266. Currency and Coin Services, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS.,
http://www.federalresrve.gov/paymentsystems/coin-about.htm (last updated Sept. 5, 2014); Duties
& Functions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
267. The letter quoted above expressly characterizes hitting the debt ceiling as like the
"deleveraging" events of 2008 that triggered the great recession. Letter from Matthew E. Zames,
supra note 129, at 2.
2014] CONFRONTING CHAOS 547
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW
This course of action also makes it more feasible for the Treasury to
defer disbursements to the unpaid creditors, providers, and payees. Thus,
the Treasury properly husbands its funds to use for other purposes.
So what may the Federal Reserve do? The Federal Reserve may
create a "Federal Creditor and Payee Facility," similar to the lending
facilities it created in the post-2008 crisis.268 In this way, the Federal
Reserve becomes the lender of last resort for unpaid government
creditors and other payees. It has the statutory authority to handle
emergencies this way, starting in the Great Depression, expanded in
1991,269 and further refined after the recent financial crisis by the
Dodd-Frank Act.27 °
For the purest example, government contractors and providers with
government invoices, processed and ready for payment, may find
themselves in line for, but not receiving, a disbursement that DFAS or
CMS delays. 271 The Federal Creditor Facility would dispense with the
usual delays and formalities for commercial bank lending against such
receivables. Immediately, the lending facility provides a no-strings,
interest-free distribution, styled as a loan, to the contractor. Instead of a
contractor getting an expected, but deferred, $1 million DFAS or CMS
payment check on Day Fifteen, the contractor gets a $1 million Federal
Credit Facility no-strings "loan" check on Day One or Day Two. The
Federal Reserve tells those receiving these distributions that they not
only may, but shall, treat these identically to a Treasury disbursement.
In doing this, the Federal Reserve seeks, first and foremost, to
prevent (or at least to reduce) the financial fallout from the hitting of the
debt ceiling.272 The contractor or provider knows that at some point,
presumably soon, Congress will end the crisis.273 And, it knows that
268. See Baker, supra note 32, at 87-88.
269. Id. at 87-88,89 & n.130.
270. Id. at 87-89.
271. More aggressively, the Federal Reserve may "deem" entire streams of daily contractor
and provider payments to be its loans. The Federal Reserve will reimburse the Treasury for taking
over a loan interest on these payments, and concretize this by direct lending relations to the
maximum number of contractors and providers. For any categories of contractors or providers not
easily diverted from DFAS and CMS payment, the Federal Reserve could make a daily estimated
payment to the Treasury on the scale of these contractor and provider disbursements.
272. Using the Federal Creditor Facility loans-which are similar to Treasury disbursements-
contractors and providers will confidently meet their own financial obligations. They will cover
their own payrolls and make their own purchases. And, they will have the motivation and the
wherewithal to continue their work for the government. Thus, the country avoids the deleveraging
event of failing to pay its contractors.
273. In the abstract, the contractors' books would not show incoming disbursements from the
Treasury liquidating the govemment obligations to pay them. Rather, the contractors' and
providers' books would show still-unliquidated government receivables, coupled with no-strings
loans from the Federal Creditor Facility.
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when the crisis ends, DFAS will take care of the loan from the Federal
Creditor Facility.
And so, in terms of mechanics, DFAS defers disbursing payments
to those contractors and providers on Day One, and thereafter. It would
still have unliquidated government obligations on the government's
books for what it had deferred paying. Those unliquidated government
obligations do not count toward the debt ceiling.
2 74
Although several complicating aspects of this receive discussion
below, the basic sequence seems clear.275 Hopefully, an agency could
hold back readily some whole category or categories of payments. In an
ideal sorting-out, DFAS and CMS might defer categories of relatively
large payments to larger contractors, vendors, and providers. For the
lending facility to handle this would produce the least chaos.276
This would give time for mitigation approaches. Hopefully, the
agencies could use the additional days to separate out vendors and
contractors to arrange for accessing the Federal Reserve's Federal
Creditor Facility.277
For another example, the President could usefully give specific
direction to those agencies that work on the greatest amounts of
274. Such obligations do not bear any resemblance to Treasury bonds, notes, and bills sold to
the public. Hence, the Treasury could defer treating its finances as the government paying those
contractors, and instead, take its funds from incoming taxes or whatever other source, and use them
to pay interest on the debt or for some other purpose.
275. For now, to summarize and simplify this sequence: (1) agencies defer payment requests
for contractors and providers; (2) the creditors and payees who basically have a government IOU
take this to the Federal Reserve facility's window; (3) the Federal Reserve discounts the anticipated
government payment, puts no-strings cash in the pockets of the contractors and providers, and its
Federal Creditor Facility carries this as one more loan on the Federal Reserve's huge balance sheet;
(4) the contractors and payees continue operating and spending, and do not create a risk of financial
collapse or recession-the Federal Reserve's facility buffers the potential injury to the economy;
and (5) the Treasury husbands its funds for other needs. As for the documentation, this is a practical
problem. At one end of the spectrum, ideally the agencies' accounting programs would generate the
kind of advice document that normally accompanies payment. At the other end of the program, the
contractor has a credible invoice and some reason to suggest that a government payment is timely.
The contractor's chief financial officer simply presents a statement and a figure to the facility. It is a
practical program what documentation to request from those coming to the Federal Reserve
window. However, there is no reason to consider it a profound problem that the documentation for a
Federal Reserve loan has some imperfection; it is a loan being made in an emergency that serves the
interest of both the government and the recipient.
276. The large contractors and vendors due to receive large payments could make the most
orderly transition to resort to a Federal Reserve facility for federal creditors. Far better, if possible,
would be for the biggest contractors to realize that they should seek and obtain Federal Reserve
loans, than to put all the employees awaiting paychecks to the task of doing so.
277. Conversely, agencies might have some ability to separate out, and to process early,
whatever few payments had special urgency as to the precise day of disbursement. Above all, by
phasing or staggering the invoicing information from all the different payment agencies, FMS could
better control what it disburses each day, and not be overwhelmed by too many agencies all at once.
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payments, like DFAS and the CMS. CMS works on provider invoice
streams, such as those related to Medicare hospital payments. 278 CMS
might have some capacity, even on Day One, but if not then at some
point, to separate out providers receiving large payments. It would be far
better, if possible, that ten or one hundred Medicare hospitals should
seek and obtain these special Federal Reserve facility no-strings, no-
interest "loans," than to put millions of the civilian agency employees of
the government to the task of doing so for their own paychecks.
B. Federal Public Debtholders Facility
A completely separate approach offers strong opportunities for
calming the credit markets while also relieving complementary strain
on the Treasury. This is aggressive, and draws heavily on presidential
power, as well as on the Federal Reserve's broad authority as the lender
of last resort.
First, the Federal Reserve can inform the Treasury it defers
payment of interest on its own holdings of Treasury bills, notes, and
bonds. Actually, this follows the substance of practice. Traditionally, the
Federal Reserve may pay ninety-eight percent of this back to the
Treasury, keeping only the comparatively small sums for its own
operations. 279 For example, in 2012, the Federal Reserve contributed
$76.9 billion to the Treasury.28°
Second, the Federal Reserve naturally buys up Treasury bills, notes,
and bonds maturing during the period of the debt ceiling crisis. 8'
278. See HIGLAS, supra note 209.
279. See SETH CARPENTER ET AL., THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S BALANCE SHEET AND EARNINGS:
A PRIMER AND PROJECTIONS §§ 2.2.4-2.2.5 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/feds/2013/201301.
280. Binyamin Appelbaum, Fed Turns over $77 Billion in Profits to the Treasury, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2012, at B5. For the Federal Reserve to change from waiting until year's end to pay the
Treasury to deferring the payment of interest during the period of the debt ceiling crisis, amounts to
a change of form, not substance.
281. There is another reason that the Federal Reserve will buy Treasury bills in particular (as
contrasted with notes and bonds). The Federal Reserve balance sheet at normal times (i.e., when the
debt limit does not produce a crisis) has almost entirely notes and bonds, not bills. See BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., QUARTERLY REPORT ON FEDERAL RESERVE BALANCE
SHEET DEVELOPMENTS 8 (2014). Normally, to affect the availability of long-term funds for
purposes like home mortgages, the Federal Reserve does not need bills. See, e.g., Mark Koba, The
Federal Reserve: CNBC Explains, CNBC (July 28, 2011, 12:43 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/
id/43752521# (discussing the ways in which the Federal Reserve can affect U.S. citizens' buying
decisions). In contrast, to affect a debt limit crisis, the Federal Reserve must greatly increase its
exposure to short-term bills. MINDY R. LEVIT ET AL., REACHING THE DEBT LIMIT: BACKGROUND
AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 16 (2013) [hereinafter LEVIT ET AL.,
REACHING THE DEBT LIMIT NOVEMBER].
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Otherwise, those Treasury markets may become disorderly.282 The
Federal Reserve defers payment of interest on these holdings, too.
Some critics might object to the concept of deferring, that is, of
informing the Treasury not to make an interest payment.283 They may
argue that the deferred interest counts as an additional quantum of public
debt, which the Treasury cannot allow to occur because it counts toward
the debt limit.2 84 However, interest will not count as a disbursement until
paid. Like deferring any other amount owed, deferring when interest gets
paid defers when it counts as a disbursement, and keeps up the balance
in the Treasury.285 Frankly, for the Federal Reserve to elbow its way to
the Treasury and demand payment at such a time would strike observers
as greedy and irrational.
Even with such a program, the Federal Reserve still holds only a
fraction of the interest the Treasury must pay on the public debt.286 Thus,
the Federal Public Debtholders Facility ("FPDF"), which the Federal
Reserve will establish, temporarily buys up the set of bills, notes, and
282. In October 2013, just before the Treasury would hit the debt ceiling, Treasury bills for that
period and the following month had an intense shortage of buyers and a corresponding rise in their
interest rates. See LEVIT ET AL., REACHING THE DEBT LIMIT NOVEMBER, supra note 281, at 16;
Daily Treasury Bill Rates Data, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=billRatesYear&year=20 13 (last
visited Feb. 15, 2015) (select "Daily Treasury Bill Rates" from the "Select type of Interest Rate
Data" drop-down then select "2013" from the "Select Time Period" drop-down).
As with the interest payments on Treasuries, the Federal Reserve may defer payment
on those Treasury securities coming due. See Robert Lenzner, The Federal
Reserve Will Lose Billions But It Just Doesn't Matter, FORBES (June 8, 2013, 6:08 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2013/06/08/the-federal-reserve-will-lose-billions-but-it-
doesnt-matter. That would be pointless because the Federal Reserve would simply buy more
Treasuries to replace the redeemed ones. Either way, these provide a relatively small piece of the
Federal Reserve's huge balance sheet of Treasuries.
283. See, e.g., Plumer, supra note 6.
284. The government always has payments it must make at some later time, like interest
accumulating on an unpaid contract, but these future payments do not count as debt. Fiscal Outlook:
Understanding the Federal Debt, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/
fiscaloutlook/understandingfederal debt/overview (last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (exhibiting which
of the government's payments and holdings counts toward the federal debt). For that matter, the
government knows that on any day it must soon pay next week's and next month's interest. But,
although interest payments must be paid soon, they do not count as debt. Id.
285. See Lenzner, supra note 282. Moreover, it would be silly to blame the
Federal Reserve as somehow not maximizing its income because it defers the
payment of interest. What the Federal Reserve receives, it pays back to the Treasury. See FAQs:
Fed Basics, FEDERALRESERVEEDUCATION.ORG, http://www.federalreserveeducation.org/faw/topics/
fedbasics.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). The difference between receiving the interest payment
from the Treasury sooner versus later, and eventually paying it back to the Treasury, has an
infinitesimal effect on the government.
286. See generally G. THOMAS WOODWARD, MONEY AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
MYTH AND REALITY (1996), available at http://home.hiwaay.net/-becraft/FRS-myth.htm.
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221bonds nearing their date to receive interest payments. 87 Then, 88 the
Federal Reserve defers payment of that interest by
the Treasury.289
As a further step, the Treasury could contact other countries'
governments and their central banks. As the press reports, "foreigners
held $5.455 trillion, or roughly one third of total U.S. debt. China holds
$1.155 trillion and Japan owns $1.131 trillion. 290 So, the Treasury
would contact the very big holders of Treasuries, namely Japan and
291China. It may ask them, too, to defer payment of interest.292
287. The FPDF may inform the Federal Reserve to defer that interest. After the date upon
which interest comes due, the Federal Reserve may sell the securities back to the market. Or, the
Federal Reserve may simply retain the securities for its balance sheet. A bond price in the market is
called the bond's "dirty price." Glyn A. Holton, Bond Accrued Interest, RISK ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://riskencyclopedia.com/articles/bond-accmed-interest (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). A buyer who
obtains the bond in time to obtain the accrued interest pays the full "dirty price." Id. Subsequently,
the market price drops since a new owner will not receive the accrued interest. Id. The price without
the changing amount of accrued interest is called the "clean price." Id. What is suggested here is
that the Federal Reserve would buy the Treasury debt at the full dirty price, just before the day of
receiving accrued interest, and sell it back at the pure clean price, without any accrued interest. The
Federal Reserve would defer the Treasury's payment of that interest. It is similar to the stock
market. The day after the dividend is recorded, as due to the shareholders, the stock will be sold-to
use the technical term, "ex-dividend." Ex-Dividend, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/e/ex-dividend.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). The market expects the stock will sell at a
slightly lower price at that point to reflect that stockowners are past the period when they would
receive that dividend. See id.
288. There are two ways: (1) the Federal Reserve may simply go into the Treasuries market
and buy what has an approaching date to pay interest; or, more elegantly, (2) the Federal Reserve
may offer repurchase agreements ("repos") on such Treasuries. For example, take a bond with an
interest payment due to the holder on November 1: the Federal Reserve would buy repos on those
bonds. Thus, the Federal Reserve would buy the bond just before interest payment, hold it during
the period when the interest is to be paid, and sell it back to the prior owner after the date for
interest payment. That repo need not last more than one or two days. The repo's terms will specify
that the interest belongs to the Federal Reserve, and be priced accordingly.
289. See, e.g., Lenzner, supra note 282.
290. Kimberly Amadeo, The U.S. Debt and How It Got So Big, ABOUT.COM,
http://useconomy.about.com/od/fiscalpolicy/p/US-Debt.htm (last updated Sept. 5, 2013).
291. Id.
292. Japan and China know that when the crisis ends, they will receive the interest. It is not to
their benefit to make the crisis more intense. And, they have the model of the United States' own
central bank doing this to the rest of the Treasuries market. They know the United States does not
just ask them to do it by themselves, but rather that the Federal Reserve is taking care of the entire
rest of the Treasuries market. See Credit and Liquidity Programs and the
Balance Sheet, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/bstopenmarketops.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). China might not agree simply
to defer interest. It made clear during the 2013 debt crisis it did not approve of the United States
going near the debt ceiling. See Ian Katz & Michael C. Bender, China Presses U.S. Lawmakers to
Lift Debt Limit, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-15/china-
presses-u-s-to-lift-debt-limit-as-tea-party-says-butt-out.html. China perceives America not behaving
responsibly about its debt as an unkind way to treat China-disrespecting China for taking
responsibility and funding the American deficit. Robert A. Profusek & Andrew M. Levine, Things
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By aggressive use of these various approaches, the Federal Reserve
may develop a system in which almost all the interest for the Treasury to
pay during the interval of the debt crisis instead gets deferred. This
would have several beneficial effects. The Treasury market, itself, gains
a large measure of confidence by the Federal Reserve vigorously taking
action in a focused way to prevent any illiquidity. Moreover, it stabilizes
the credit markets. These markets will see that the Federal Reserve has
backed up the Treasury by making it all but impossible for the Treasury
to default on its debt, quite apart from all the other measures taken by
the Treasury. It bears saying again, that such meliorating steps will not
reduce the intense and desperate political pressure to raise the debt
ceiling. A bank analysis "estimates that if we blow past the debt
ceiling and [the] Treasury starts prioritizing payments, the S&P 500
could lose 10 percent of its value. And that's without an actual default on
the debt."'2 93
Meanwhile, it defers the burden on the Treasury of interest
payments. Deferring $1 billion of interest payments provides
considerably more relief than deferring $1 billion dollars of
payments to contractors.294
C. Social Security Beneficiaries Facility
The Federal Reserve may try the most aggressive measure of all:
financing Social Security distributions. Without Federal Reserve help, at
best, Social Security beneficiaries would have to wait several weeks
beyond their normal date for their first distribution, and increasingly
longer delays for distributions after that. The Treasury handles Social
Security specially. 295 The large sum of monthly Social Security
Are Looking Up: The Outlook for M&A Transactions in 2014, in MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS LAW
2014: ToP LAWYERS ON TRENDS & KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR, at *5 (2013). If
China refuses, at least it may agree to a repo arrangement similar the one just described for private
holders of Treasuries. See supra note 288. That is, China might agree to sell repos to the Federal
Reserve when interest comes due, getting the securities back the next day, and letting the Federal
Reserve defer the interest while paying China the Federal Reserve's own repo reimbursement. This
would ask China for reasonable cooperation, as opposed to a favor.
293. Plumer, supra note 170 (emphasis added).
294. As described above, the Treasury must move heaven and earth to make sure it pays every
dollar of interest, in order to fend off, even briefly, defaulting on the debt. See supra text
accompanying note 35. By taking the interest fears off the Treasury's mind, it frees the Treasury to
act more freely in juggling the other obligations of the government, including its obligation to needy
beneficiaries. The Treasury has the least flexibility in whether it pays interest on its debt, and much
greater flexibility in timing its other responsibilities.
295. FIN. MGMT. SERV., supra note 173, at 44 ("FMS issues payments from four Regional
Financial Centers (RFCs) located in Austin, TX; Kansas City, MO; Philadelphia, PA; and San
Francisco, CA."). The main stream of Social Security payments goes through one separate FMS
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payments at the start of the month requires that many days of tax
revenues build up before the Treasury's FMS may make the
large-scale disbursement for that Social Security payment day.296 As a
result, the group of Social Security beneficiaries would face delays in
getting money.297
Unlike other creditors, it is impractical to have millions of
individual Social Security beneficiaries apply individually for "loans" at
the Federal Reserve's discount window. No system could cope with an
enormous volume of applications suddenly and hastily made. And, the
millions of senior citizens lack business experience and may not readily
understand a complexly justified, suddenly devised procedure.
Yet, it is as desirable with this group-if not more so-to produce
the same end-state as with the other creditors. Before discussing the
justification, look at the end-state sought here of a Federal Reserve
lending facility like the others. Other creditors bring their
documentation, like a Medicare provider bringing a statement of sums
expected now for disbursement, to the Federal Reserve discount
window.298 They end up with a cash distribution in hand, without strings,
interest-free, nominally only lent by the Federal Reserve. 299 So,
similarly, the Federal Reserve may establish a Social Security
Beneficiaries Facility. At the beginning of each month, on the day when
the Treasury sends out checks, it should take two steps.
First, the Social Security Administration posts on its website, and
announces by other means, that the Social Security distributions
nominally have the status of loans by the Federal Reserve. They remain
regular distributions without strings or interest, which beneficiaries cash
and spend in the usual way. The Treasury website further explains that
the nominal loan "deeming" ends promptly and automatically when
Congress raises the debt limit. At that time, the Federal Reserve squares
accounts with the Social Security Administration and deems the loan
satisfied. The Social Security Administration further states an
expectation that Congress will review its actions, and the Social Security
financial center in Kansas City. Id. at 108. Perhaps, the Treasury may open, or close, the Social
Security stream there.
296. See, e.g., DEBT LIMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 26-27; Plumer, supra note 165.
297. See, e.g., DEBT LIMIT ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 26.
298. See Baker, supra note 32, at 89-90 (discussing the collateralization of discount window
loans under Dodd-Frank).
299. See id. at 83-84, 89-90. The agency owing them payment, like CMS, carries on its books
an unliquidated obligation to the creditor until the debt crisis passes. Id. at 84-85. When the debt
ceiling eventually gets raised, the agency will square accounts with the Federal Reserve, by CMS
liquidating the obligation, and, the Federal Reserve will deem the loan against the creditor satisfied.
See text accompanying notes 243-66.
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Administration throws itself on the judgment of Congress to
consider ratifying its maintaining of Social Security distributions during
the crisis.
Second, as the Treasury sends out the Social Security checks and
electronic deposits, it submits an approximate total figure to the Federal
Reserve and requests that the Federal Reserve provide a sum
corresponding to the tens of billions of dollars just distributed. That is:
(1) the Treasury makes its distributions to the individual beneficiaries of
this "loan;" (2) the Treasury immediately accepts the Federal Reserve's
provision of the total sum of all those distributions; and (3) the Federal
Reserve receives, from the Treasury, an assignment by the Treasury of
the total of the individual "loans" that the Treasury is making to
individual beneficiaries. Nominally, the distributed money is owed to the
Federal Reserve, not by the Treasury, but by the individual beneficiaries.
The Federal Reserve has great discretion in what it deems acceptable
justification for a loan in an emergency.3 °0
In doing this, the Treasury acts on behalf of the group of Social
Security beneficiaries.30  These Treasury roles both arise from the
manifest impracticality of anyone other than the Treasury's FMS
generating the enormous set of electronic deposits and checks going to
the Social Security beneficiaries.
The end-state for the Social Security beneficiaries parallels the end-
state described above for creditors at other facilities. They have cash
distributions in hand, nominally deemed loans of the Federal Reserve,
but not in any way affecting their use.30 2 And, the Treasury's own level
of funds survives unreduced by the Social Security distributions, so that
it stays under the debt ceiling.3°3
300. The Dodd-Frank reform has the effect that "it requires that the collateralization of
discount window loans be sufficient to protect taxpayers from loss." Baker, supra note 32, at 89. In
this instance, the Federal Reserve has a type of assignment or subrogation right from the statutory
obligation of the government to pay Social Security beneficiaries. While this is not a right that an
ordinary creditor can ordinarily obtain, the impediment here is the debt limit crisis, not the unrelated
desire of Congress that creditors not come between beneficiaries and their payments. So, the Federal
Reserve may use these assigned rights as collateral to buy the "loan" from the Treasury.
301. To deal with the impracticality of tens of millions of Social Security beneficiaries from
applying individually, the Treasury itself applies to the Federal Reserve for their loan collectively.
To deal with the impracticality of transferring to the Federal Reserve, the task of sending tens of
millions of Social Security benefits to the right location, the Treasury itself acts as the Federal
Reserve's agent for making distributions.
302. See supra text accompanying note 299.
303. The Social Security Administration carries, on its books, an unliquidated obligation until
the debt crisis passes. When the debt ceiling eventually gets raised, the Social Security
Administration will square accounts with the Federal Reserve, by the agency liquidating the
obligation in favor of repaying the Federal Reserve, which will deem the lien satisfied.
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The powerful doctrine of ratification applies with singular aptness
to the Treasury and Federal Reserve actions in the crisis in general, and
the actions as to Social Security beneficiaries in particular. 304 That
doctrine most famously applied to President Lincoln's sweeping actions
at the start of the Civil War, setting the Union forces in motion.3°5
Lincoln maintained he had authority for those actions, although it did not
appear from statutes and the existing doctrines of unilateral presidential
power hardly sufficed.30 6
Famously, Lincoln prodded Congress to ratify his actions.0 7 It did,
by an express statutory provision.30 8 The case of ships captured by the
Union blockade brought the issue to the Supreme Court.30 9 A divided
Court upheld the President's actions.310 It spoke favorably about his
authority, but very definitely noted Congress's express ratification.3 1
The ratification doctrine has become applicable in present-day society.312
An administration facing an emergency crisis, like hitting the debt
ceiling, may properly invoke the ratification doctrine, especially if it
does so in a well-supported way. Even though the President knows that
when the crisis passes, the debt limit will go up, the President cannot
simply breach the debt ceiling and justify beefing up the public debt on
his own by waving a magic wand and saying that Congress will later
ratify his action. The use of the doctrine proposed here has much more
support than just a blanket invocation.
First, politically, arranging payments for Social Security
beneficiaries will have public support beyond anything else the President
may do. Consider if the Social Security payments do not come. Every
congressional office will have its phone banks crashed, its websites
overcome, and its inboxes flooded, with fear, outrage, and anger. The
public does not see Washington as having the power to treat Social
Security as some kind of policy football. Rather, the public sees Social
Security payments on the regular monthly date as a vested right.313
304. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 54, at 174-75 (discussing the historical roots of ratification);
Monaghan, supra note 54, at 27-29 (citing President Lincoln's action during the Civil War and his
belief of the need for congressional ratification of presidential action).
305. Monaghan, supra note 54, at 27, 28 & n.136.
306. Id. at 27-28, 67-68.
307. Adler, supra note 54, at 179; Monaghan, supra note 54, at 28 & n.136.
308. Monaghan, supra note 54, at 179.
309. See generally Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
310. Id. at 670-71, 699.
311. Id. at 670-71.
312. For another well-known example, an important opinion during the Indochina War, see
generally Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that Congress had impliedly
ratified the Nixon Administration's war policies).
313. See, e.g., Elmer F. Wollenberg, Vested Rights in Social-Security Benefits, 37 OR. L. REv.
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Washington must not get in the way-that is all. Any approach that
keeps those checks and electronic distributions coming will win out over
the alternative of failing to do so.
Popularity alone would not deal with an insurmountable legal
problem. But, it does show why the President confidently seeks and
expects ratification. He may aim at implied ratification, such as the
simple raising of the debt limit without further action. But, he may aim
at seeking an express provision in the debt limit bill, approving the
Social Security action.
Second, as numerous law review articles have analyzed, existing
statutory policy reflects special treatment of Social Security.3 t4 Social
Security has its elaborate apparatus of Social Security Trust funds.31 5
These include the deposit in the fund of special Treasury securities
reflecting amounts owed by the government for expenditure, as to future
payments to beneficiaries.316
Third, and potentially most important, section four of the
Fourteenth Amendment, itself, holds an important indication.3t 7 Section
four states in relevant part: "The validity of the public debt of the United
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred in payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection and
rebellion, shall not be questioned. ' '3 " Although the section uses
language of the Civil War era, the classic commentator on the
provision's history noted that "the draftsman had in mind the possibility
of future" government problems, not just the then-present one.319
This is the one place in the Constitution where the word
"pension[]" appears. It is no accident that the Public Debt Clause
provides authority for almost anything the President can do to continue
distributions to senior citizens.321 As said by a leading student of the
debates underlying the Public Debt Clause: "Powerful political interest
299, 354 (1958).
314. See sources cited supra note 38.
315. Buchanan, supra note 38, at 270-73.
316. LEVIT ET AL., REACHING THE DEBT LIMiT NOVEMBER, supra note 281, at 28 & n.1 14. In a
different vein, "[i]n early 1996, Treasury announced that it had insufficient cash to pay Social
Security benefits for March 1996, because it was unable to issue new public debt." Id. at 5. So, "[t]o
allow benefits to be paid in March 1996, Congress authorized Treasury to issue securities to the
public in the amount needed to make the March 1996 benefit payments and specified that, on a
temporary basis, those securities would not count against the debt limit." Id.
317. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 4.
318. Id. (emphasis added).
319. Phanor J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 CORNELL L. Q. 1,
18 (1933).
320. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
321. See McCommas, supra note 21, at 1319.
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groups, including bondholders and former soldiers and sailors, organized
to pressure members of Congress to protect the federal debt, including
pensions.' 322 Moreover, "[o]ver two million people fought for the North
between 1861 and 1865," and "[b]y the close of the year 1864, the
subject of pensions was playing a large part in national affairs. 323
And, "[t]he new pensioners had a large interest in the federal debt ... if
the federal government defaulted, the veterans would likely not receive
their pensions. 324
Pointedly, the draftsman had in mind the huge veterans' and
survivors' pension system of that time, probably the closest, before the
New Deal, the country ever came to a pension system on the scale of
Social Security.325 Again, this Article does not propose recondite
speculations about lofty Fourteenth Amendment theories, or the efficacy
of actions eliminating the debt limit. Rather, it draws on the nuances of
the wording and background of the Fourteenth Amendment as a concrete
expression of a practical concern in factual reality: pension distributions.
Critics may argue that whatever Congress has done, by statute or by
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not excuse future Social Security
payments from the debt limit. However, the pressing issue does not
concern a pitch that Social Security's status baldly nullifies the debt
ceiling. A Federal Reserve lending facility does the work here-a
facility with some notable qualities, to be sure, but still one that produces
an end-state that makes sense when placed alongside the Federal
Reserve lending facilities in the crash of 2008-2009.326 Economists, like
political leaders, recognize Social Security as a great stabilizer against
financial shocks.327 Quite apart from the Treasury's predicament, it
makes sense in the economic world for the Federal Reserve to stabilize
the economy in a debt limit crisis by establishing a Social Security
Beneficiaries Facility.328 These other legal points just bolster the case
that the President may act in anticipation of ratification.329
As for the "ratification principle" itself, it calls for: (1) the President
to have a legally colorable basis for authority before its exercise; (2) the
notification of Congress; and (3) the express or implied approval
322. Id. at 1316 (emphasis added).
323. Id. at 1317-18 (quoting 4 JOHN WILLIAM OLIVER, HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR MILITARY
PENSIONS, 1861-1865, at 10 (1917)).
324. Id. at 1318.
325. Id. at 1317-19.
326. Emergency Lending Facilities, supra note 26.
327. See Solomon & Strumpf, supra note 24.
328. Id.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 304-28.
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by Congress.33° President Lincoln's actions at the start of the
Civil War epitomize this principle. The President asserted novel and
expansive views of his powers, took action, and asked Congress for its
express approval.331
The President did this partly as a legal case, for the Supreme Court
ultimately approved his action, 332 but also as a political case, for he
pressured Congress to expressly come on board his war policies, which
it did.333 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
similarly applied the ratification principle to the Vietnam War in
Orlando v. Laird.
33 4
A President's coordination with the Federal Reserve to provide the
Social Security Beneficiaries Facility accords with this model. The legal
authority laid out here provides colorable authority. The strength of the
political case for continuing Social Security distributions enables him to
anticipate congressional ratification. Congress will approve actions for
Social Security distributions, confirming that emergencies require
special procedures. 335  Ratification applies, first and foremost, in
emergency situations, which hitting the debt ceiling surely is.
33 6
V. CONCLUSION
Some may feel disappointed that this Article approaches the debt
ceiling issue as a matter of details about disbursing agents and Federal
Reserve facilities. They may prefer the soaring abstract constitutional
theories constructed around the rarely invoked section four of the
Fourteenth Amendment.337
Those theories had their place before the 2013 debt ceiling crisis.
338President Obama did not choose to rely on them. It is time to go
beyond arguments that the debt ceiling is somehow not a ceiling.
Analysts of the separation of powers may employ two types of
theories, drawing on an old distinction in science. The deductive theories
start with great principles about the edifice of the constitutional system,
the conceptual frameworks of the Framers, the general reasoning about
330. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, A Proposed Model for Determining the Validity of the Use
of Force Against Foreign Adversaries Under the United States Constitution, 29 Hous. L. REv. 379,
417 (1992).
331. Monaghan, supra note 54, at 27, 28 & n. 136, 29.
332. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670-71 (1862).
333. Id. at 670.
334. 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 313-16.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 305-21.
337. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
338. Strickland, supra note 20, at 801-02.
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the President and Congress, and so on. 339 From these, scholars deduce
some theory for some context. Deductive separation of powers theories
have their use. But, by their very nature, they connect with factual reality
in only a limited way.
On the other hand, inductive theories start with a great deal of
information about the relations between the President and Congress, and
so on.3 40 One approach to executive privilege consists of reviewing
many important clashes about it. Those writing about war powers may
review many instances of presidential action, or instances of what
Congress does. 34 1 A great work about executive agreements traces two
centuries of them.342 The list goes on.
This Article takes an inductive approach to the separation of
powers.343 It builds up a sense of the President's powers from the
concrete specifics of what he has done and may do.3 " It seeks to work
out the details in difficult, low-visibility subjects---executive mechanics
of disbursements by different agencies, the arrangements of the interest-
payment and tax-deposit worlds, and potential Federal Reserve lending
to Social Security payees.345
From these aspects of fiscal life, it derives its separation of
power notion.346 Namely, it concludes that the Executive Branch has
enough power to arrange its distributions, and to coordinate with Federal
Reserve lending facilities, so as to not fall into disorder and chaos from
hitting the debt ceiling.347
Both types of theories of the separation of powers have their merits.
A deductive theory achieves a degree of clarity and consistency. It soars
above trivia. It connects larger theories to smaller contexts, creating an
elaborate edifice of thought and shedding light on everything involved.
However, frankly, the debt limit kind of clash in the separation of
powers does not get decided from rarified and recondite abstractions.
With interest rate payments coming due, the President does not just say
"abracadabra," state some deep understanding of the constitutional
structure, and make the debt ceiling vanish. When the nation gets
through the awful event of a hitting the debt ceiling, it will not owe
doing so to abstrusely articulated principles. Government functioning
339. See supra text accompanying notes 56-70.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
341. See generally Monaghan, supra note 54.
342. See generally Ackerman & Golove, supra note 59.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
344. See supra Parts I1-1V.
345. See supra Parts III.C-1V.A.
346. See supra Parts Ill.C-IV.
347. See supra Part IV.
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will depend on those conducting the effort having a set of tools and
tactics to handle the situation-concrete, detailed, reality-based tools and
tactics. It is hoped that an inductive kind of approach, as introduced by
this Article, will aid them.

